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ABSTRACT 
 
Examining Experience in Depressed and Nondepressed Individuals 
by 
Jedidiah Gunter 
Dr. Christopher Heavey 
Associate Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
The inner experience of nine depressed and nine nondepressed individuals was 
explored using Descriptive Experience Sampling.   Each participant completed four days 
of descriptive experience sampling, exploring about six moments of their inner 
experience on each sampling day.  Although the Depressed participants self-reported 
substantially higher levels of depressive symptomatology on the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CES-D) on each day of sampling, the 
differences in the frequency of depressive symptomatology in the inner experiences of 
these two groups were not statistically significant.  Despite the group differences not 
reaching statistical significance, the Depressed group experienced somewhat more 
frequent moments of depression, anxiety, fatigue, body discomfort, negative feelings, 
negative content, and fewer instances of positive feelings and content than the 
Nondepressed group.  The two groups experienced the five most frequent phenomena of 
inner experience identified in prior DES studies (inner seeing, inner speaking, 
unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness) at similar rates. Moments 
reflecting constructs related to depression, such as Beck‘s Negative Cognitive Triad, 
were either very infrequent or absent.  Overall, differences in the inner experience of the 
depressed and nondepressed participants observed via descriptive experience sampling 
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were much less pronounced than the differences in their global self-reports of depressive 
symptomatology via the CES-D.  The implications and possible reasons for this are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A depressive episode is made up of a cluster of symptoms that can debilitate a 
person for an indefinite period of time.  Typical symptoms of depressed individuals 
involve distorted negative thinking, a sluggish/lethargic demeanor, and a sad/dejected 
emotional state. The symptoms not only impact a person over an extended period of time, 
they also are evident in a person‘s momentary daily experiences.  Examples of what it is 
like for a depressed individual to experience moments of depression can be viewed in the 
following moments collected by Gunter (2008).  A 51-year-old ―was emailing a friend 
who lives in the Philippines. He was writing about his alcoholic past.  He was feeling 
remorse and sadness.  He described this feeling as a huge sense of despondency.  It was 
accompanied by a nauseous feeling in his stomach.  He also had an image of a head-on 
car crash viewed from the side from about 50 feet away.  In his image the cars were just 
coming into contact; this image is a reconstruction of a crash he was involved in years 
ago while he was driving drunk.  He doesn‘t remember the details of the crash because he 
was drunk, but this is the image he has recreated of what he thinks it was like.  The cars 
in his image were generic and lacked details such as color‖ (Gunter, 2008, p. 131). 
 A depressed 19-year-old male ―was in his kitchen and he was standing up reading 
a birthday card from his dad‘s girlfriend.  He was focused on the number ‗18,‘ which was 
pretty big on the card.  The numbers were in black with white background.  He was 
feeling really angry throughout his body.  His body felt really tense and his hands were 
clenched.  He was wondering how they could forget how old he was and why they were 
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giving him a card a week late.  He was also feeling a low level of sadness that they had 
forgotten his age and anticipation in his stomach that was experienced as butterflies in 
response to waiting for his friend‖ (Gunter, 2008, p. 79). 
A 19-year-old depressed female ―was in her room getting ready for bed and was 
about to start reading a book.  She was thinking about her friend‘s suicide.  She was 
experiencing an image of what happened when her friend had committed suicide.  The 
scene was mainly in black and white.  She saw the scene from about 40 feet away at the 
entrance of the friend‘s room.  She saw her friend in her walk-in closet.  There was a belt 
attached to a wooden post and she saw her friend hanging there wearing a black shirt.  
Her friend was angled to the side with her stringy hair covering her face.  There were no 
clothes hanging up, but some shirts on the floor of the closet.  She could see part of her 
friend‘s bed which had a bright blue comforter‖ (Gunter, 2008, p. 72). 
 An 18-year-old depressed male ―was outside of his car at his family‘s restaurant.  
He saw his aunt‘s car and was wondering why his aunt‘s car was there and not his 
mom‘s.  He had an image of a car accident.  In this image he saw his mom‘s car after it 
had been hit by a semi–truck.  He could see the front of the truck at a bit of a side angle.  
It was slightly damaged.  He felt like he was walking around the corner and saw his 
mom‘s Ford Explorer.  The tires were missing, it had shattered windows, the hood was 
gone, and the rear door missing.  He could see a lot of blood on the driver‘s seat and 
stereo.  The blood was very vivid.  There were two drops of blood on two teddy bears on 
the dashboard.  The scene was in black and white.  He felt sadness that was experienced 
as weakness in his body‖ (Gunter, 2008. p. 82).  
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 Detailed moments of depressed experiences such as these may reveal the unique 
characteristics of depression for an individual.  Depression has many commonly 
occurring symptoms across people that are displayed both behaviorally and cognitively; 
however individuals may experience these symptoms in different ways or in different 
forms.  For instance, in the first example involving the 51-year-old male, his moment of 
depressed experience was in the form of inner seeing, whereas the second example 
involved an 18-year-old male whose depressed experience was in the form of a feeling, 
perceptual awareness, and unsymbolized thought. The detailed experiences of depressed 
individuals revealed in these snapshots of conscious awareness have not been fully 
explored in a large sample of depressed individuals.  A collection of detailed portrayals 
of moments of experience has the potential to reveal invaluable information about what it 
is like for different individuals to experience depression. 
 To meet criteria for a major depressive episode as specified by the DSM-IV-TR 
(APA, 2000), a person must experience five symptoms of depression for at least two 
weeks.  One of these symptoms must be either a depressed mood (feeling sad or irritable) 
most of the day, nearly every day or a loss of enjoyment in pleasurable activities.  
Additional possible symptoms include: significant changes in weight; significant changes 
in sleep; significant changes in motor activity; loss of energy or fatigue; inappropriate or 
excessive feelings of guilt or worthlessness; diminished ability to think or concentrate; or 
frequent thoughts of death or suicide.  Criteria for a minor depressive episode would be 
met if a person meets two to four of the symptoms with the same severity and duration.  
 The World Health Organization (2005) estimated that more than 121 million 
people worldwide experience depression.  Epidemiological research done in the United 
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States, however, reveals rates of depression much higher than the estimate by the World 
Health Organization.  For example, Kessler et al.‘s (2003) epidemiological study of 
major depressive episodes revealed that up to 17% of individuals in the United States 
meet criteria for a major depressive episode at least one time in their life.  The DSM-IV-
TR (APA, 2000) reported that 10%-25% of women experience a major depressive 
episode while the rate is 5%-12% for men.  In a given year it is estimated that 6.6% of 
individuals will meet criteria for a major depressive episode (Kessler et al., 2003). Point 
prevalence studies reveal that women (5%-9%) are more likely than males (2%-3%) to 
experience a major depressive episode (APA, 2000).  Community surveys have reported 
as many as 20% of adults will experience a major depressive episode (Kessler, 
Avenevoli, & Merikangas, 2001) while structured diagnostic interviews typically find the 
point prevalence of a major depressive episode to be as high as 6% for adolescents 
(Kessler, Avenevoli, & Merikangas, 2001) and as high as 4.9% for adults (Kessler, 
1994).  The discrepancy between the community surveys and structured diagnostic 
interview studies may be due to people experiencing minor depressive episodes and not 
meeting full criteria for a major depressive episode (Gotlib & Hammen, 2002).   
 Most commonly, the first episode of major depression occurs in the mid 20‘s, 
often after a severe psychosocial stressor (APA, 2000).  Symptoms of depression usually 
develop over days or weeks and may last for months at a subsyndromal level (APA, 
2000).  If a major depressive episode occurs but is left untreated, that person can expect 
to be experiencing a depressed mood for four months or longer (Kessler et al., 2003; 
APA, 2000).  Fortunately, most people who experience a major depressive episode have 
complete remission of symptoms and return to normal functioning (APA, 2000).  
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However, 5%-10% of depressed individuals continue to meet full criteria for two or more 
years (APA, 2000). Depression at its worst may lead to a person committing suicide.   
Not only does depression cost society lives, it also has significant monetary 
effects in terms of work related loss of production and health services provided.  It is 
estimated that major depression is responsible for an annual $52 billion dollars being lost 
due to work absences and productivity reductions in the US labor force (Greenberg et al, 
2003).  Furthermore, $26 billion is spent annually on health services for the treatment of 
depressive symptoms.  
To measure the toll that various illnesses take on society, the World Health 
Organization has developed the concept of disability adjusted life years.  Disability 
adjusted life years is measured by the number of years of potential life lost due to 
premature mortality and the years of productive life lost due to disability. To date, 
depression is ranked second among 15-44 year olds in terms of disability adjusted life 
years; it is predicted to rank second to cardiovascular conditions for all ages by the year 
2020 (WHO, 2005).   
Nearly three-fourths of people who experience a major depressive episode will 
experience at least one other DSM-IV-TR disorder in their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2003).  
Anxiety disorders appear in 59% of those who have experienced a major depressive 
episode.  Substance abuse disorders (24%) and impulse control disorders (30%) are also 
found at elevated rates among people who have experienced a major depressive episode 
(Kessler et al., 2003).  The high rate of comorbid symptoms has made it difficult for 
researchers to apply a specific depression theory to a pure sample of depressed 
participants. 
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A plethora of research has been generated in an attempt to test the validity of 
reputable theories of depression.  This research, taken as a whole, suggests that the 
leading theories of depression cannot completely explain the onset and maintenance of 
depression.  Researchers have employed numerous methodological strategies focused on 
understanding the experience of depression.  However, most of these methodologies 
involve a depressed person describing his/her experience of depression retrospectively, 
often long after it has occurred.  This is potentially problematic because research has 
shown that participants experiencing psychological symptoms make errors and distort 
recall of events or feelings (e.g., Lewinsohn & Rosenbaum, 1987; Wells, & Horwood, 
2004).   
Depression research also indicates that the leading theories of depression cannot 
completely explain the different manifestations of depression unique to each individual.  
To complicate things further, most depression theories are based on specific schools of 
thought. Each researcher has his/her own methodological strategy and real life 
experiences that influence his/her perception of how depressive symptoms are manifested 
in each individual.  Thus depression researchers have sometimes used unique 
methodological strategies that have tapped into different aspects of depression.  
To date, several large scale studies have investigated the symptomatology of 
depression (e.g., Beck, Ward, & Mendelson, 1961; Radloff, 1977); few studies, however, 
have carefully examined the momentary experience of depressed individuals. The current 
study will carefully examine the unique experience of depression in a group of 
individuals using the descriptive experience sampling method (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 
1993).  DES is a method designed to facilitate the faithful apprehension of moments of 
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inner experience.  In DES participants are randomly cued by a beeper to attend to specific 
moments of experience.  Participants then write down notes about their experience at the 
moment of the beep and take part in an expositional interview about these moments 
within 24 hours.  The goal of these interviews is to develop faithful descriptions of 
sampled moments of experience.  DES has been used with participants experiencing 
abnormal psychological symptoms and participants who are not (e.g., Hurlburt, 1990, 
1993, Hurlburt & Happe‘, 1994).  Several prior DES studies have explored depression 
using small samples consisting of three to six participants (Hurlburt, 1993; Perlotto, 
2001; Cavenagh, 2003; Gunter, 2008).  Tentative nomethetic characterizations were 
made by these studies. This study will use a larger sample of depressed individuals 
potentially allowing us greater confidence to discuss the nature and variability of 
experience during depression. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Since the beginning of psychology, researchers have invested a great deal of 
heart, money, and time into understanding people‘s inner life.  For instance, the very first 
psychology research lab, established by William Wundt in 1879, was dedicated to this 
cause.  The methodological strategy employed by Wundt was called introspection.  The 
goal of introspection was to obtain accurate reports of an individual‘s thoughts, feelings, 
or sensations.  Introspection was used to gather data in natural and contrived 
circumstances.  As interests grew in the method it quickly became the standard tool used 
in psychological research.   
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, two researchers, Wundt and Titchener, were 
leaders in introspective research.  Wundt used introspection in an attempt to measure the 
speed of various psychological processes.  This effort was called ―mental chronometry.‖  
Titchener choose to focus his efforts on cataloging mental elements.  Titchener‘s goal in 
cataloging mental elements was to provide a psychological analogy to the periodic table 
of elements found in chemistry.  Wundt and Titchener cataloged 240,070 mental 
elements (Adams, 2000).  Despite the enormity of these finding, researchers of the time 
choose to focus on the disagreement among introspectionist including the concept of 
imageless thought (Adams, 2000).  The disagreement was pivotal to the demise of 
introspective research in the psychological community.  Following Titchener‘s death in 
1927, the introspectionist movement became dormant for more than a half century 
(Adams, 2000).  
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As the years passed new methods became the central focus of the field of 
psychology.  After introspection faded from the scene in the early part of the 20
th
 century, 
behaviorism became the dominant method of research for psychology.  Behaviorism 
appealed to the psychological community because it limited psychological study to overt 
behavior that could be easily quantified and measured.  After decades of behavioral 
research had been undertaken, consensus grew that the behavioral mechanisms of 
learning and conditioning could not account for all important psychological processes.  
For example, Chomsky‘s (1959) research with infants led him to conclude that 
individuals could generate words that had never been spoken before.  This conclusion 
conflicted with the behaviorists‘ belief that language could only be learned through 
operant conditioning.  Chomsky‘s findings set in motion another renaissance in the field 
of psychology.  Similar to introspection declining in favor of behaviorism; the study of 
behaviorism was gradually eclipsed by cognitive psychology and eventually the broader 
discipline of cognitive science.  Once again there was renewed interest in people‘s inner 
life.  
Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field that involves psychology, 
neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, computer science, anthropology, biology, and 
physics.  Disciplines of cognitive science and neuropsychology are primarily interested in 
understanding the functioning of the brain; they employ a variety of methods to gain this 
understanding (e.g., studying reaction time or conducting brain imaging with fMRIs).  
The increasing popularity of cognitive science and neuropsychology has coincided with 
revived interests in inner life.  Inner life can include a variety of characteristics, such as 
cognitions, feelings, sensations, perception, etc. 
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Numerous methodological strategies have been developed in an effort to study 
people‘s inner experience.  However, the methods used differ substantially, each having 
relative strengths and weaknesses.  Moreover, some methods may well be better suited to 
exploring inner experience than others.  The most common current strategies for studying 
inner experience are questionnaires and clinical interviews.  Unfortunately there is 
substantial research that calls into question the extent to which people can accurately 
characterize their inner experience as requested by such methods (Hurlburt, Heavey, & 
Seibert, 2006).  In the next section I will discuss the general methodological issues one 
should consider when trying to understand the nature of people‘s inner experience. 
 
Methodological Considerations When Studying Inner Experience 
 Hurlburt, Heavey, and Seibert (2006) identified methodological issues involved in 
research on inner experience and provided guidelines for how researchers might address 
these issues.  They concluded that there are many issues that influence the accuracy of 
reports about inner experience.  Two overarching issues include the ability of participants 
to accurately recall their experience (i.e., memory-related issues) and the extent to which 
measurement procedures can affect the reports of inner experience.  Memory issues that 
need to be considered in research on inner experience can be broken down according to 
the stages of memory: encoding, storage, and retrieval.  Potential procedural 
measurement issues include reactivity, ecological validity, and demand characteristics.  
Each of these issues will be addressed in turn. 
 The encoding stage of memory involves the initial step in the stimulus being 
imprinted into the individual‘s memory.  Stimuli can enter the individual‘s memory from 
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any active working sensory receptor.  A problem that may occur during this initial 
encoding stage is the target stimulus may not have been sufficiently encoded.  Thus, if 
the stimulus was not encoded, it will have no chance of proceeding to long-term memory.  
If the stimulus does not proceed to long-term memory, then later retrieval of the stimuli 
will be impossible. Stimuli may not be encoded in an individual‘s memory for a variety 
of reasons such as the individual‘s lack of attention to the stimuli or the individual being 
bombarded by competing cognitive information.  Even if the individual is able to encode 
a specific stimulus, research has shown that an individual‘s memory is susceptible to 
numerous types of errors in the encoding stage such as: focus, perception, understanding 
and expertise (Haber & Haber, 2000).  For example, with regard to an individual‘s focus 
on stimuli, attention will be centered on the stimulus that is of the utmost interest to the 
individual.  Generally, people have a wide-range of attention.  However, some features of 
an event can cause involuntary narrowing of attention, resulting in some details of an 
event not being attended to at all.  Therefore an individual may have only encoded what 
s/he had focused on (Haber & Haber, 2000). 
 Deficits in a sensory area may also interfere with a person being able to report 
accurately the details of the stimuli.  For example, if Joe needs glasses to see clearly, he 
may report more accurately visual stimuli when viewed with the glasses than when 
viewed without them.  Joe without glasses may need or be inclined to use his imagination 
to report the details of the event.  Similar problems may occur with the recall of inner 
experiences.  If the individual was not adequately attending to the inner experience, then 
the individual may ―fill in the blanks‖ using his/her beliefs or other available information 
when later reporting on that experience (Haber & Haber, 2000). 
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 The belief and expectations an individual uses to organize and understand a 
stimulus during encoding can also be a problem.  Allport and Postman (1947 cited in 
Haber & Haber, 2000) did a study in which individuals saw one of two scenes: two white 
men with one of them holding a knife; and one white and one black man with the white 
man holding a knife.  After a period of time had passed, the participants were asked to 
describe the scene.  Participants in the first condition all correctly described which man 
held the knife; however, most participants in the second condition identified the black 
man as having held the knife.  Even some of the individuals in the second condition who 
correctly identified the white man as holding the knife choose to describe the white man 
as defending himself.  The results of this study suggest that encoded stimuli can be 
influenced by one‘s beliefs.   
Similarly, Bartlett (1932, cited in Haber & Haber, 2000) asked participants to read 
descriptions of a sequence of events.  Participants were divided into two groups.  The 
first group read the description of the events that were logically ordered in terms of one‘s 
expectations.  The second group was given the same description but in an unordered way.  
The participants in the first condition remembered and reported some of the events with 
accuracy; however, the participants in the second condition were inaccurate in there 
reporting of the event.  The participants in the second condition frequently reported the 
unordered sequence of events in a logically ordered way.  Bartlett interpreted this finding 
as indicating that an individual sometimes encodes stimuli in a way that fits his/her 
expectations.   
 A fourth potential problem in encoding stimuli is the individual‘s familiarity or 
expertise related to the stimuli.  An individual who is an expert in a field may interpret 
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stimuli differently than the layperson.  For example, if there were a loud rumbling noise 
coming from a car‘s engine, a car mechanic would likely interpret the engine noise 
differently than would the layperson. Thus, these four factors (focus, perception, 
understanding, and expertise) can affect the encoding of a specific stimulus. 
The storage stage of memory is also susceptible to errors in the individual‘s 
process of remembering and recalling details of an event.  Specifically, this stage of 
memory is susceptible to errors involving memory capacity and decay. Miller‘s (1956) 
research has led him to conclude that people do not have an unlimited amount of 
information that can be processed, received, and remembered.  Miller discovered that 
most people only have the ability to remember and produce seven plus or minus two 
chunks (e.g., digits, letters, words) of information in short-term memory.   
Memory decay has been shown to influence what stimuli will make it past the 
storage stage of memory and into long-term memory.  Rubin and Wetzel‘s (1996) 
concluded that individuals are susceptible to a rapid loss of information following an 
event.  Furthermore, the accuracy of the recall of information becomes even poorer as 
time increases relative to the occurrence of the event (Bernard, Killworth, Kroenfeld, & 
Sailor, 1984). Tourangeau (2000) developed a mathematical formula in an attempt to 
calculate the amount of information that can be retained as a function of time.  
Tourangeau concluded that memory decay increases monotonically over time; however, 
it occurs rapidly at first then slows down.  
The storage stage of memory can be influenced by a number of factors including 
the primacy effect.  The primacy effect is the phenomenon of remembering more stimuli 
at the beginning of a sequence than stimuli at the end of the same sequence.  This 
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phenomenon possibly occurs as a result of the limited time available for rehearsal and/or 
the decrease in the ability to process new stimuli as information continues to be 
presented.  Furthermore, rehearsal (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), processing (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972) and lexical status of the contents (Hulme et al., 1995) can influence 
when stimuli make it through the storage stage of memory.  Research on the primacy 
effect and memory capacity and decay suggests that an individual‘s ability to provide 
accurate recall of information following an extended delay must be looked at with 
skepticism.   
 As information proceeds through the storage stage of memory and into long-term 
memory, a person will have to access long-term memory in order to produce an answer to 
a question.  The process of recalling information can be referred to as the retrieval stage 
of memory.  The ability to retrieve specified information can be enhanced by 
associations, contexts, or mood.  The retrieval stage of memory can also be prone to 
errors.  Specifically, an individual‘s recall of information can be influenced by semantic 
versus episodic access (Tulving, 1984, 1993) and biasing effects of mood-congruent and 
state-dependent memory. 
 When retrieving an answer to a question, the question itself can influence the type 
of memory that an individual will use to access his/her answer.  The type of memory that 
people will access in answering a question is either semantic or episodic memory 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002).  Semantic memory holds memories of meanings, 
understandings, generalizations, and knowledge unrelated to specific experiences.  
Semantic memory is thought to be relatively immune to interference and forgetting 
(Tulving, 1993).  Episodic memory can be accessed when an individual is asked to report 
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on particular lived events or experience.  Episodic memories include experiential details 
including such things as time, place, and associated emotions. Robinson and Clore (2002) 
stated that people‘s ability to access their episodic memory declines greatly after a week.  
Both semantic and episodic memory may be accessed in any given question. The 
implication of the question can dictate which answer the participant is able to accesses., 
however, it is also likely that a person will have no access to an episodic memory related 
to some fact or belief regardless of what question they are asked.   
A question that requests a person to characterize his/her experience over time may 
well draw on semantic memory for retrieval of the answer (Tulving, 1984, 1993).  This is 
potentially problematic because of the distortions involved in semantic memory 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002).  Robinson and Clore (2002) provided a review differentiating 
between emotion (episodic, contextual) and beliefs about emotion (semantic, conceptual).  
In their review, they explained that contextual details of events can aid in recall of 
emotions.  However, as time lapses, recall of contextual details declines which may cause 
random and systematic retrospective biases.  As details are lost, the memory of an 
emotion shifts from episodic memory to semantic memory.  Once semantic memory has 
taken over for an event, other retrospective biases may become involved, such as belief-
consistent bias.   
An example of belief-consistent bias can be seen in a study by McFarland and 
Ross (1987).  They followed a number of romantic relationships over a two-month 
period.  At the beginning and end of this two-month period the couples were asked about 
their perception of their romantic relationship.  In addition, at the end of the two-month 
period the couples were asked to recall what their feelings had been at the beginning of 
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the study.  The results of the retrospective reports appeared to be systematically biased in 
the direction of their current perceptions at the end of the two-month period.  This led the 
researchers to conclude that a person‘s beliefs can have direct effects on retrospective 
reports.  Specifically, estimations of prior feelings may be prone to errors.  
Methodological strategies that invoke episodic recall are ideal for minimizing errors 
associated with retrieval of memory.  Specifically, an ideal study will target recent, 
specific, clearly identified moments, thus minimizing biases associated with semantic 
memory, such as self-theory bias, confirmation bias, and pre-existing schemata (Hurlburt, 
Heavey, & Seibert, 2006). 
 Accuracy in retrieving information from memory can also be influenced by the 
state of mood the individual is experiencing at the moment of recall.  Mood-congruent 
memory is the term that is used to describe this phenomenon.  For instance, Safer and 
Kueler (2002) asked prospective therapy clients to complete a measure of symptomatic 
distress prior to enrolling in therapy and after terminating therapy.  The researchers found 
that clients tended to overestimate their pre-therapy stress to a greater extent than a 
control sample.  The researchers suggested that the results indicated that the clients 
believed they were experiencing more positive change over time.   
Similarly, Lewinsohn and Rosenbaum‘s (1987) study of depressed participants‘ 
recall of parental behavior indicated that present level of depression significantly affected 
descriptions of how loving and rejecting their parents had been.  Furthermore, Denny and 
Hunt (1992) conducted a study with individuals who were experiencing depression.  
They reported that the depressed individuals recalled negative emotions at a higher 
frequency than what had actually been reported at the time of experience.  In addition, 
 
  17 
 
Beck (1967) and MacLeod and Matthews (1991) reported that individuals experiencing 
depressive symptoms recalled significantly more negative self-referential material than 
what was actually experienced.  Thus a participant who is completing a self-report 
questionnaire may be influenced by the state of mood s/he is currently experiencing.  
Specifically, an individual who is experiencing depressive symptoms may endorse more 
mood congruent items and may rate items relating to negative affect as more frequent and 
more severe than actually experienced. 
 The phenomenon of mood-congruent memory not only affects people who are 
experiencing psychopathological symptoms, it can affect people who are considered free 
of psychological distress.  Natale and Hantas (1982) concluded from their research with 
psychological distress-free individuals that, depending on the person‘s present affective 
status, an individual might bias his/her perception of past states of mind.  Thus, all 
participants can be susceptible to mood-congruent memory bias.   
Accuracy in the retrieval of information from memory can also be influenced by 
state-dependent memory.  Research has shown that the internal physiological state (Eich 
et al., 1975) and physical surroundings (Eich, 1980) of the individual can influence what 
s/he may recall at a later time.  For example, Eich et al., (1975) conducted research on the 
effects of smoking marijuana on learning.  The research design for the study was made up 
of four different conditions: encode under the influence of marijuana placebo—recall 
under the influence of a placebo, encode under the influence of a placebo-recall under the 
influence of marijuana, encode under the influence of marijuana—recall under the 
influence of marijuana, and encode under the influence of marijuana—recall under the 
influence of a placebo.  The placebo-placebo group obtained the highest scores of recall 
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of information.  Interestingly, the marijuana—marijuana group recalled more information 
than the marijuana—placebo group.  Saufley et al., (1985) has also shown that the 
environment that an individual is in at the time of testing and at a later recall time can 
influence the recall of information.  Specifically, Saufley et al., found that recall of 
information was greater if the individual was in the same environment at recall as s/he 
was in during encoding.  Thus the internal physiological state and physical surroundings 
can influence an individuals‘ retrieval of information.   
Collectively, the research on memory associated with the encoding, storage, and 
retrieval stages suggest that individuals are susceptible to a variety of memory errors.  
Any of these concerns can influence the accuracy of the participant‘s responses.  As 
influential as memory can be on the accuracy of an individual‘s response, measurement 
procedures may be just as important in obtaining accurate reports of inner experience. 
Procedural measurement issues include reactivity, ecological validity, and 
demand characteristics.  The measurement instrument may influence an individual‘s 
response to items on a self-report questionnaire.  Specifically, an individual may be 
influenced in such a way that s/he may behave or respond in a way that is different than 
s/he naturally would.  For example, if an individual knew that s/he was being observed, 
s/he may act or respond in a different way than s/he would outside of the research 
context.  If this was the case, then the person would be ―reacting‖ to the research 
measure.   
In the process of completing an item on a self-report questionnaire, Tourangeau 
and Rasinski (1988) identified four stages that a participant will experience in the 
inquiry-response of a particular item: comprehension and meaning of question; 
 
  19 
 
assembling relevant information (e.g., salient events, interactions, self-characterizations); 
judgment by integrating relevant information; and finally a response that is tailored to the 
format of the question.  The authors concluded that the stages at the beginning of this 
process could be prone to measurement reactivity.  Reactivity can be broken down into 
three problem areas: within measure context effects, meaning clarification, and self-
referencing (Knowles & Byers, 1996). 
Within measure context effects suggest that subsequent responses to items can be 
influenced by the individuals‘ responses to previous items.  Specifically, Knowles (1988) 
found that an item‘s serial position rather than the diversity of the question was a source 
of influence on an individuals‘ response.  Thus an individual‘s response to items on a 
self-report questionnaire may be influenced by the item‘s serial position in addition to the 
person‘s actual state. 
The subjective meaning of an item can also influence an individuals‘ response.  
Research has shown that differences in respondent answers can reflect the perceived 
meaning of the question more than the actual state of the individual (Crutchfield & 
Gordon, 1947).  Furthermore, items that invoke spontaneous, effortless implicit meanings 
can influence an individual‘s response (Uleman, 1987).  Finally, an individual‘s 
interpretation of the meaning of items at the beginning of a test may influence the way 
s/he interprets the meaning of items later on in a test (Bargh & Pratto, 1986). 
Items on self-report questionnaires that ask respondents to relate the content of the 
item to their self-concept can be prone to the self-referencing error.  Essentially the 
process of generating a response to a particular item related to the self-concept will 
activate information related to self-referential material.  Bargh and Pratto (1986) state 
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that once the self-concept has been activated it may prime other aspects of self-
evaluation.  Thus the activation of the self-concept and subsequent activation of other 
aspects of self-evaluation may lead to more links, elaborations, and assimilation of the 
concepts tapped by the items on the questionnaire (Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989).  This 
may lead to greater polarization and more consistency among subsequent items on a 
questionnaire.  To reduce participant reactivity, the method used in a study should be as 
open-ended as possible.  In addition, the method should attempt to not invoke other 
processes within the individual beyond the capture and report of the experience 
(Hurlburt, Heavey & Seibert, 2006). 
Ecological validity is one of the most difficult objectives to obtain for a self-
report questionnaire.  To obtain ecological validity a studies method, materials, and 
settings must approximate the real-life condition (Brewer, 2000).  Typically, self-report 
questionnaires do not approximate the real-life conditions nor are they completed within 
the context of the individual‘s environment.  Hurlburt (1997) concluded that the typical 
experiment couldn‘t obtain ecological validity because it attempts to provide one 
condition that is identical for all participants.  Thus to maximize ecological validity, 
experimenters should conduct research in the participant‘s natural environment with as 
little contact as possible in the testing condition. 
Another procedural measurement issue that must be considered when using 
retrospective self-report questionnaires is the demand characteristics of the study.  
Demand characteristics are cues given by the experimenter or the experimental context 
that indicate to the participant the desired outcome.  The cues may be given consciously 
or unconsciously by the experimenter.  Demand characteristics can be communicated via 
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age, sex, ethnicity, accent, appearance, social status, questioning, nonverbal behaviors, 
and personality traits of the experimenter(s).  As a result of these cues, a participant may 
consciously or unconsciously be influenced to provide answers that echo the desired 
results of the experimenter rather than provide answers that best represent the participant.  
Weinberg, Wadsworth, and Baron‘s (1983) study on eyewitness memory report found 
that they were able to influence participant‘s responses by the type of questioning and 
nonverbal feedback given.  Another study involving the influence of demand 
characteristics showed a video of a bicycle theft to participants.  All participants saw the 
same video and then participated in one of three question conditions: unbiased 
questioning; requesting specific information without suggesting an answer; and 
questioning suggesting an answer (Cassel et al., 1996).  Cassel et al reported the 
participants in the latter condition were influenced the most by the questioning.  Thus, 
this body of research suggests the demand characteristics can influence the accuracy of 
reports.  
Social desirability bias is also a concern with self-report studies.  Social 
desirability bias is the tendency to present oneself in a way that will be viewed favorably 
by others.  Sensitive topics (e.g., sex, health, psychological symptoms) can place 
participants in uncomfortable situations.  When confronted with these topics, a 
participant may answer inaccurately or perhaps leave out details for ego-defense or 
impression management reasons (Fisher, 1993).  Thus a researcher must be concerned 
about the potential effects of social desirability when using self-reports. 
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Methods that Minimize Measurement Errors 
As should now be clear, there are substantial issues that need to be considered 
when researching inner experience.  In recent years a number of methods have been 
developed in the attempt to gain a fuller and more accurate understanding of inner 
experience.  The Descriptive Experience Sampling method minimizes problems that are 
associated with memory and retrospective errors because this method focuses on inner 
experience phenomena at a particular moment in time marked by the onset of a beep and 
report within 24 hours.  Other methods, such as the Experience Sampling Method (ESM; 
Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983), cue participants with a beeper and ask them to 
complete a questionnaire. A full description of these and other inner experience sampling 
methods is provided below. These methods address concerns related to retrospective 
recall and methodological issues that cast doubt on more conventional methods.  
Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations 
 Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS; Davison, Robins, & 
Johnson, 1983) is a paradigm that allows the researcher to gain access to people‘s 
thoughts and feelings as they occur.  ATSS is a highly structured, experimentally 
controlled situation that attempts to access cognitions as people actually experience them.  
The ATSS procedure was developed in an effort to reduce memory errors, censoring, and 
distortions that are common problems in retrospective self-reporting.  The procedure uses 
an open-ended verbal response formant.  ATSS researchers have increased control in the 
experimental procedure as they are able to specify and manipulate situations as well as 
induce different emotional states.  The procedure requires little cost and time by the 
experimenter to complete a study.  
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Typical ATSS experiments include a participant listening to an audio recording of 
a conversation for several segments.  Davison, Vogel, and Coffman (1997) prefer an 
audio presentation to a video presentation because it allows participants to create their 
own images of simulated situations and it may permit greater personal relevance and 
meaningfulness.  However, video presentations are allowed if the experimental procedure 
is highly structured.  At any rate, the participant is required to listen to an audio recording 
for 15-25 seconds and after the recording has finished the participant is instructed to 
verbalize his/her thoughts as they occur for about 30 seconds.  Participants are instructed 
to pretend that they are actually part of the scenario.  Typical scenarios last for about 5-8 
segments.   
 ATSS has shown good construct validity, with correlations ranging from .75 to 
.86 (Davison, Vogel, & Coffman 1997), face validity (Davison, Feldman, & Osborn, 
1984), and concurrent validity (Davison, Feldman, & Osborn, 1984).  Kashima and 
Davison (1989) investigated the test-retest reliability of ATSS by presenting participants 
with the same audio recording twice.  It was found that thoughts varied more in surface 
similarity than they did in terms of functionality (e.g., irrational thinking).  Kashima and 
Davison suggested this finding meant participants do not always verbalize everything on 
their minds; however, the functionality (schematic) of the participants can be attained by 
the method.  Possible limitations of the method include the choice of strategy used by the 
experimenter to analyze the data, and the numerous possible coding schemes that can be 
used for each experiment (Davison, Vogel, & Coffman 1997).  In addition, coding for a 
particular construct (e.g., irrational thinking, selective abstraction, maximization-
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minimization) may require extensive hours of training before intercoder reliability can be 
achieved (Davison, Vogel, & Coffman 1997). 
 White, Davison, & Haaga (1992) explored cognitive bias in depression using 
ATSS.  They played audio recordings of negative (rainy day at a barbeque), neutral, and 
positive situations to participants in an effort to explore cognitive bias.  Participants 
included 15 depressed and 15 nondepressed psychiatric patients.  Results of the study 
indicated that depressed participants showed more signs of cognitive bias in only the 
negative situation than did nondepressed psychiatric patients.  These results indicate that 
situation-specific cognitive biases can be identified in relatively unstructured depressive 
cognitions.  This means that not only do depressed participants endorse more negative 
cognitive bias response items; they also experience negative cognitive bias in their 
thoughts as they occur in real time. The authors suggested that these results provide 
support for the methodology as well as a feature of Beck‘s cognitive theory of 
depression.  
Think Aloud 
The think aloud method requires participants to speak out loud what they are 
thinking while engaged in a particular task assigned to them by the researcher. The 
participant‘s thought processes are tape recorded and subsequently used to determine 
thought content. Thoughts are collected without probes or questions, thus avoiding biased 
answers and potentially providing explanations of participants‘ behaviors (Meichenbaum 
& Cameron, 1981). The primary advantage of the method is data are collected 
immediately as the cognitions are occurring, minimizing retrospective memory biases.  
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The think aloud method was inspired by the need of cognitive and clinical 
psychologists to understand the role of thoughts in relation to affect and behavior 
(Davison, Vogel, & Coffman, 1997). The think aloud method has been used in a number 
of studies targeting depression.  Studies have used participants who were induced to 
experience a negative mood (Bates, 2007). Other studies have investigated thought 
processes of individuals who were depressed (e.g., Barnhofer, de Jong-Meyer & 
Kleinpaß, 2002; Dodrill, 2005; Heidenreich, Junghanns-Royack, & Stangier, 2007). 
Dysphoria has also been studied using the thought processing method (Conway, Howell, 
& Giannopoulos, 1991; Mayo & Matsumi, 1996).  
Bates (2007) investigated thought suppression related to negative intrusive 
thoughts.  It is believed that thought suppression can cause heightened accessibility of 
unwanted negative thoughts during suppression, as well as paradoxical effects on post-
suppression mood.  People who exhibit this style of thinking are believed to be 
vulnerable to depression.  Seventy-six nondepressed college participants were given 
phony negative feedback on a test that measured social competence.  Participants were 
then assigned to one of four conditions: suppressed their reactions to feedback; expressed 
their reactions to feedback; concentrated on a previously described memory of positive 
feedback; or free-range discussion.  Participants were required to verbalize their thoughts 
for five minutes in their respective condition and again without the constraints of the 
instructions.  The suppression group experienced a larger number of test feedback 
thoughts following the end of the mental control condition than did the expressive or 
control groups.  The author suggested the results demonstrated post-suppression 
intrusions of unwanted thoughts about a personally relevant negative event.  The results 
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supported previous research findings that show suppression creates a link between 
unwanted thoughts and mood context, thus demonstrating that post suppression thought 
intrusions are associated with depressive affect (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Klein, 1991). 
Dodrill (2005) investigated the effect of verbal disclosure of feelings and 
emotions on recovery from dysphoric mood.  One hundred and eighty-seven 
undergraduate participants who had recently experienced a stressful event took part in the 
study.  Half of the participants were classified as mildly depressed and the other half of 
the participants classified as nondepressed according to the BDI-II.  Participants were 
placed in one of three audio taped conditions: reflect on deepest feelings and thoughts 
related to the event; simply think aloud; and discuss a recent news event.  Participants 
were required to take part in this procedure once per week for 20 minutes over three 
consecutive weeks.  In addition, participants filled out questionnaires related to mood 
outcome, ruminative response style, and dysfunctional attitudes.  Participants experienced 
a decrease in dysphoric mood in two of the three conditions namely, reflect on deepest 
feelings and thoughts related to the event and simply think aloud.  Dysphoric participants 
scored higher than nondysphorics on ruminative responses, however, dysphorics also 
scored higher on emotional processing suggesting that ruminative tendencies do not 
impair productive emotional processing.  These results did not lend support to rumination 
theory.  However, ruminative tendencies were robust among dysphorics.   
Conway, Howell, and Giannopoulos (1991) investigated the suppression of 
unwanted thoughts in dysphoric participants.  Twenty-one dysphoric and 21 
nondysphoric participants according to the BDI-short form took part in the study.  In 
study each participant was assigned to one of two conditions: success feedback on a test 
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or failure feedback on a test.  Following the feedback session, participants were 
specifically asked not to think about the feedback they received while participating in a 
five-minute think aloud procedure. Compared to non-dysphoric participants, the 
dysphoric group had more thoughts about failure and fewer thoughts about success. 
During the final minute of the procedure, dysphoric participants in both feedback 
conditions had more intrusions of failure in their thoughts.  In study two, 31 depressed 
and 28 nondepressed participants were asked not to think of the neutral target - white 
bears.  Dysphoric participants showed a similar thought pattern as evinced in study one, 
where they experienced a higher degree of intrusion of the target (white bears) that they 
were specifically asked to avoid thinking about. The authors concluded that dysphoric 
participants demonstrated evidence for the mood-congruence hypothesis where they were 
less successful at suppressing thoughts of any kind. This study also lends support to the 
cognitive-effort hypothesis, which suggests that during the later stages of a suppression 
period, dysphoric participants have reduced cognitive effort. 
Mayo and Matsumi (1996) investigated self-statements generated by dysphoric 
and nondysphoric participants during an interpersonal problem-solving task. Thirteen 
dysphoric and 15 nondysphoric participants were shown a three-minute videotape of an 
interpersonal problem (relationship breakup).  Participants were told to identify with the 
same-sex character and to think aloud as they generated solutions to the conflict.  
Participants‘ answers were coded in five categories: task facilitating, task inhibiting, 
emotion-focused, problem-focused, and periods of silence.  Contrary to dysphoric 
participants‘ belief that they would generate fewer solutions than nondysphoric 
participants, they were able to generate as many effective solutions as nondysphoric 
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participants.  Dysphoric participants evidenced fewer problem-focused statements and 
more emotion-focused statements.  The socially coded score of solution effectiveness 
correlated negatively with the frequencies of emotion-focused self-statements.  This last 
finding supports Beck‘s view that negative thoughts of people who are depressed can 
hinder active searching of problem-solving alternatives.   
Barnhofer, de Jong-Meyer, and Kleinpaß (2002) explored whether depressed 
participants evidenced overgeneral autobiographical memories.  Overgeneral 
autobiographical memories were operationally defined as statements that referred to a 
generic summary of events.  Fifteen depressed and 15 nondepressed participants took part 
in the study.  Participants were asked to listen to cue words (e.g., angry, happy, safe) and 
then recall an autobiographical memory.  Participants then verbalized everything that 
came to mind.  Verbal descriptions were coded as specific (referring to a particular day or 
location), categoric (overgeneral – series of repeated events) or extended (a memory for 
an extended time frame).  Depressed participants evidenced fewer specific memories and 
more categoric memories.  There was no difference between the groups regarding the 
numbers of extended memories recalled.  The authors took these results as suggesting 
that depressed participants produced more sequences of consecutive categoric memories 
than specific memories.  Thus depressed participants exhibited an overgeneralizing 
retrieval style when cued to recall autobiographical memories.  This process resembles 
ruminative processes in that it reflects a recurrent focusing on self-descriptions.   
 Heidenreich, Junghanns-Royack, and Stangier (2007) also examined overgeneral 
autobiographical memory in depressed participants.  Participants in the study included 18 
depressed, 18 social phobics, and 18 healthy controls.  In order to meet criteria for 
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inclusion into the depressed group a participant had to meet a depression diagnosis 
according to the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 1 Disorders (SCID; 
First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams 2002) and have a score of at least 18 on the BDI.  
Participants listened to cue words (e.g., happy, sorry, angry) and were instructed to 
verbalize their thoughts.  In addition, participants completed a visual analog scale 
measuring the participant‘s perceived difficulty for each testing situation and experienced 
strain or arousal, respectively, during each task.  In contrast to the results of Barnhofer, 
de Jong-Meyer, and Kleinpaß (2002) and other studies (Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; 
Williams & Scott, 1988) that have found overgeneralization in autobiographical memory 
of depressed participants, this study did not find any evidence of overgeneral 
autobiographical memory in depressed participants. 
 The data generated by various studies using the think aloud method provide 
informative and important insights about the thoughts and related affect of depressed 
individuals. The method‘s immediate focus on thoughts as they occur is one of the 
method‘s most notable advantages as it minimizes memory errors based on retrospective 
recall. However, the think aloud method lacks ecological validity and may be vulnerable 
to limitations such as reactivity and incomplete reporting (Genest & Turk, 1981). The 
think aloud method is conducted in a laboratory which questions the method‘s ecological 
validity and generalizability. Given that the method only focuses on verbal reports, it may 
force participants to ignore or under-report other forms of inner experience such as 
feelings, sensations, or images that are difficult to convey verbally. For reasons related to 
social desirability, participants may be reluctant to verbalize thoughts that are unrelated 
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to the assigned task or inherently personal thoughts that may arise when the participant is 
engaged in the task. Such limitations are problematic and difficult to circumvent.  
Thought Sampling 
Thought sampling is another method of research that attempts to gain access into 
participants‘ inner experience.  The goal of thought sampling is to quantify characteristics 
or aspects of thoughts (Hurlburt, 1997).  Thought sampling researchers usually provide a 
beeper to the participant.  The beeper will beep at random intervals.  Following a beep, 
the participant rates his/her thought content on a series of Likert scales.  Thought 
sampling minimizes some of the issues involved in retrospective recall by the immediacy 
of reports and unpredictability of when a beep will take place.  There is a scarcity of 
research applying the thought sampling method to depressed participants. 
 Josephson, Rose, and Singer (1999) used thought sampling to assess the effect of 
mood on spontaneous cognition with depressed and nondepressed participants.  
Participants completed the BDI and were assigned to one of two mood induction 
conditions: sad and neutral video clips.  Participants verbalized their thoughts after they 
were randomly beeped during a 15-minute period.  The data showed a correlation 
between participants‘ mood and thought content in both conditions. Additionally, there 
was a significant correlation between thought content and the BDI.  Depressed 
participants were found to have more overall negative thought content than nondepressed 
participants.   
Ecological Momentary Assessment 
 Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) is a sampling strategy that was created 
for the purpose of describing a person or a process (Shiffman & Stone, 1998).  EMA is 
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noteworthy for its precision in collecting empirical data on subjective experiences (Stone, 
Shiffman, & deVries, 1999).  EMA studies employ a variety of sampling strategies to 
collect multiple momentary assessments.  Sampling strategies can include time, event, 
and signal contingent prompting.  If the experimenter chooses to use the time contingent 
strategy, a participant will provide data at fixed, predetermined intervals (e.g., every six 
hours, on a daily basis at 10 am, etc.).  Event contingent protocols require a participant to 
provide data at every occurrence of a specified target or trigger event.  The target or 
trigger events (e.g., sadness, fatigue, phone call, etc.) are established prior to the study by 
the experimenter.  The signal contingent sampling strategy requires participants to 
provide data at every moment that a random signaling device (pager, wrist watch, palm 
top computer) prompts them.  When the participant is signaled (event, time, or signal) 
s/he will fill out a self-report measure or record a directly measured physiological 
phenomenon (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure; Shiffman, 2000).  Typically, participants 
will use a handheld computer to record their data.  The benefits of the handheld 
computers are ease of use and detection of fake diary entries.  Furthermore, handheld 
computers can minimize participant‘s errors involving skipping questions or providing 
answers that are ambiguous. Handheld computers may minimize demand characteristics 
and social desirability because of the lack of intrusiveness that a participant may 
experience in an interview (Bendtsen & Timpka, 1999).  EMA has been used with 
various populations to study behavioral (e.g., smoking, alcohol drinking patterns), 
physiological (e.g., blood pressure, cardiovascular responses) and psychological (e.g., 
anxiety, drug dependence) phenomena.   
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Biller (2005) used EMA to identify depressed participants‘ patterns of mood, 
thought, and socialization while undergoing psychotherapy.  Thirty-two depressed and 30 
undergraduate psychology students participated in the study.  The depressed participants 
were divided into two groups consisting of 12 and 20 participants.  Three participants out 
of the group of 12 recorded their cognitions and mood twice a day for six weeks via 
EMA.  The remaining nine participants dropped out of the study for reasons consisting of 
termination of psychotherapy, not completing the study requirements, therapist request, 
and software problems.  The three participants rated 30 statements on a Likert scale when 
signaled. Additionally, the three participants completed a BDI-II three times over the six-
week period.  The two remaining groups consisting of 20 depressed and 30 controls 
completed a BDI-II and the same 30 statements required of the three depressed 
participants one time.  A decrease in negative affect was not found over the course of the 
study for the depressed participants.  In addition, no common patterns emerged between 
the depressed participants‘ responses to positive and negative affect questions.  The 
author concluded that EMA could help individualize treatments by identifying patterns of 
behaviors that would not otherwise be discussed in traditional psychotherapy.  
The EMA method has limitations. EMA studies employ the use of palm top 
computers to increase the ease of data collection. However, the use of palm top 
computers requires a substantially higher level of financial commitment as well as 
technological knowledge on behalf of the researcher (Stone, Shiffman, & deVries, 1999). 
Although, palm top computers provide time stamps as when the participants recorded 
their experience, which improves timeliness in reporting, studies have found that a 
substantial portion of participants do not provide timely reports. For instance, Farchaus 
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and Corte (2003) found that 55% of EMA study participants did not record their 
experience in a timely manner, 15% or more admitted to recording data within 2 hours of 
the signal. Such delays raise questions about the accuracy and validity of data obtained 
using the EMA method as even minor delays could lead to an over or under estimation of 
the frequency of target events (Friedman & deWinstanley, 1998).  
EMA often employs a repeated measures design, which generates a large quantity 
of data covering a good portion of the participant‘s daily life. However, the repeated-
measures design can be burdensome for the researcher as well as the participant. EMA 
participants are typically required to spend a large amount of time training in the task of 
self-monitoring after which they are asked to record data several times, daily for the 
entire length of the study (Stone & Shiffman, 1994). Such time demands can lead to 
problems with attrition and selection bias (Stone, Shiffman, & Devries, 1999).  
Experience Sampling Method 
The Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983) was 
designed to capture systematic daily events and experiences in an individual‘s life.  ESM 
can be considered an attempt to develop a quantitative approach to introspection.  
Participants are signaled by a wristwatch alarm or a pager to complete self-assessments in 
their natural settings.  Self-assessments address phenomena related to cognitions, 
emotions, symptoms, motivation, and activities.  In addition, participants usually describe 
their physical and social context.  The pager is designed to go off during semi-random 
intervals of approximately 90 minutes.  Typically an ESM study requires a participant to 
respond to 10 beeps per day over the course of one-week.  Following data collection, 
statistical analyses are performed to help interpret the data.  The goal of ESM is to gain 
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an understanding of the participant‘s internal state and external behavior.  ESM is able to 
reveal unique information about the mechanisms of thoughts and behaviors that are often 
difficult to obtain using standard psychological methods (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 
1995). 
Quite a few studies have employed ESM with depressed participants (Kraan et al., 
1992; Merrick, 1992; Mokros, 1993; Barge-Schaapveld, Nicolson, & Berkof, 1999; 
Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Peeters, Nicholson, & Berkhof, 2003; Peeters, Nicholson, 
Berkhof, & Delespaul, 2003).  Kraan et al. (1992) investigated the usefulness of the ESM 
procedure as a supplement to other diagnostic criteria (e.g., DSM-III-R) in distinguishing 
depressives from remitted depressives and nondepressed individuals.  Sixteen currently 
depressed, six remitted depressives, and four nondepressed participants completed ESM 
and a SCL-90.  Participants filled out Likert-scaled items and open-ended questions for 
six consecutive days, 10 times per day upon hearing a signal emitted by a pager.  Likert-
scaled items consisted of symptoms associated with major depression (e.g., tired, lonely, 
down, empty) as well as items indicating positive mood (e.g., energetic, satisfied, 
cheerful, secure).  A panel of clinical psychologists chose items that best represented 
depression from the Zung Depression Scale, BDI, Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, 
Plutchik-van Praag‘s Depression Inventory, and Carrol Scale.  The depression, anxiety, 
and somatization dimensions of the SCL-90 significantly correlated with the mean 
negative mood (depression) factor of the ESM procedure, indicating convergent validity.  
Depressed (current and remitted) participants were found to have a significantly higher 
mean score of negative mood compared to nondepressed.  However, the negative mood 
factor was unable to differentiate currently and remitted depressed participants.  Upon 
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further examination, the authors determined that the positive mood factor was able to 
differentiate the two depressed groups.  The authors concluded that depressive patients 
are characterized best by a decrease in positive mood rather than an increase in negative 
mood.   
 Merrick (1992) investigated the everyday experiences of seven currently 
depressed (CD), seven previously depressed (PD), and 14 nondepressed (ND) 
adolescents.  Participants were beeped eight times per day and filled out Likert-scaled 
items that were specific to dysphonic mood (sad, lonely, grouchy, angry, bored, and 
pleasure).  The author looked for differences in the experience of the items between 
groups on three different axes: frequency, intensity, and duration.  CD experienced more 
sadness, loneliness, boredom, and anhedonia than ND.  Intensity of dysphoric mood was 
highest in the CD group, while PD reported the least mood intensity when experiencing 
dysphoric symptoms.  Environmentally, CD spent much of their free time at home (often 
in their living room) and spent little time in public places compared to the other groups.  
Furthermore, CD spent little time participating in productive activities such as 
schoolwork or working a job.  Socially, CD spent significantly more time alone than the 
other groups.  Of the 239 moments collected from the CD group, not one moment 
involved the CD participant spending time with only one member of the opposite sex.  In 
addition, only 4% of the CD moments were spent with more than one member of the 
opposite sex.  
 Mokros (1993) explored the difference between single-time-point clinician-based 
judgments and multiple-time-point self-reports for three specific symptoms of depression 
(sadness, irritability, and anhedonia).  Mokros hypothesized the role of communication in 
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a major depressive episode diagnosis cannot be limited to the study of interpersonal 
interactions alone.  Seven depressed and 14 healthy adolescents were signaled eight times 
on seven consecutive days to complete the Random Activities Survey.  In addition, 
participants noted time of day, physical location, whom they were with, and what they 
were doing at each signaled moment.  As part of the study, participants were interviewed 
prior and immediately after completion of the study by a clinician.  Depressed 
participants reported more sadness than the control participants during the clinical 
interview; however during ESM, both groups showed similar rates of sadness.  More than 
half of the depressed participants (four out of seven) experienced less irritability than 
what was predicted via the clinical interview.  Furthermore, two depressed participants 
judged to be pervasively anhedonic by the clinical interview did not show any evidence 
of anhedonia in their ESM ratings. 
 Barge-Schaapveld, Nicolson, and Berkof (1999) compared the effects of mood 
states, physical complaints, and activity satisfaction to a momentary measure of quality of 
life (mQoL) in depressed and nondepressed participants.  Sixty-three depressed and 22 
nondepressed participants completed the mQoL self-report form following each signal, 
10 times per day for six consecutive days. The mQoL self-report form assessed current 
mood, physical complaints, and enjoyment of activity on seven-point Likert scales.  
Following completion of ESM, participants filled out retrospective measures assessing 
global quality of life, mood, physical complaints, enjoyment of daily activities, and 
depressive symptoms.  Depressed participants exhibited lower levels of mQoL, positive 
mood, and enjoyment of activity, higher negative mood, and more frequent and severe 
complaints than nondepressed participants.  Similar to Merrick (1992), depressed 
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participants were less likely to engage in activities or working at a job than nondepressed 
participants.  Depressed participants were found to have more variability in their mQoL 
than nondepressed participants.  This finding was supported in Gunter (2008) where 
depressed participants exhibited more variability in positive and negative moments than 
nondepressed participants.  These findings led Barge-Schaapveld, Nicolson, and Berkof 
to conclude that mQoL can be useful in determining the impact of depression on daily 
functioning and well-being.  
Myin-Germeys et al., (2003) examined depressed participants‘ emotional 
reactivity to daily life stressors.  Forty-six depressed participants, 42 suffering from non-
affective psychosis, 49 healthy controls, and 38 bipolar participants completed a self-
assessment form 10 times per day for six consecutive days.  The self-assessment form 
was made up of seven-point Likert scaled items assessing participants‘ thoughts, current 
context, appraisals of the current situation, and mood.  Depressed participants exhibited 
significantly higher negative affect and lower positive affect than all other groups.  With 
regard to emotional reactivity, bipolar participants evidenced a decrease in positive affect 
in response to stress while depressed participants experienced a significantly larger 
increase in negative affect in response to stress compared to controls. 
Peeters, Nicholson, Berkhof, Delespaul, and deVries (2003) investigated the 
effects of daily events on the mood of depressed participants.  The authors hypothesized 
that severity of depressed episodes would influence mood reactivity to daily events.  In 
addition, a current episode of depression and a history of previous episodes of major 
depression would decrease reactivity in negative affect and positive affect with regards to 
positive events as well as increase reactivity of both mood states to negative events.  
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Forty-seven depressed and 39 healthy participants completed self-reports of mood (e.g., 
irritated, guilty, happy) and events, 10 times per day for six consecutive days.  All mood 
and event items were rated on seven-point Likert scales.  Participants were requested to 
describe at the moment of each beep any positive and/or negative event(s) that may have 
occurred since the prior beep and to rate the event(s) on the same Likert scales.  
Following participant completion of ESM, independent raters rated positive events on the 
dimensions of pleasantness, importance, and stress and negative events on the dimensions 
of unpleasantness, importance, and stress.  Depressed participants reported fewer positive 
events than nondepressed participants; however, the reported number of negative events 
did not differ between groups.  The experience of negative affect in response to negative 
events lasted longer in depressed participants.   
Recent research examining abnormal cortisol levels in depressed individuals 
purports that abnormal levels of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis related to stress 
has a part in the pathophysiology of major depression.  Peeters, Nicholson, and Berkhof 
(2003) explored whether there is a difference in cortisol levels in response to negative 
and positive daily events among depressed and nondepressed participants.  Forty-seven 
depressed and 39 nondepressed participants filled out self-report questionnaires of mood 
and events while simultaneously providing saliva samples 10 times per day for six 
consecutive days.  The authors examined the influence of clinical characteristics, mood 
changes, and gender differences in cortisol responses to events.  In response to a negative 
event, depressed participants showed no changes in cortisol levels, whereas nondepressed 
participants experienced increases in cortisol levels.  When facing a negative event, 
depressed women showed more change in cortisol levels than depressed men.  Depressed 
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participants with a family history of mood disorders displayed even smaller increases in 
cortisol levels when experiencing a negative event.  Negative affect did not appear to be 
associated with cortisol levels in depressed participants.  Positive events did not affect 
cortisol levels in either group.  The results suggest that the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal axis of depressed individuals show blunted responses to negative daily events and 
mood changes. 
ESM has been used primarily to study mood, quality of life, and the context of 
experience and has provided beneficial insights related to these topics. The ESM method 
has limitations. One of the major limitations of the ESM method is its use of a self-report 
questionnaire. It would be impossible to construct a questionnaire that contains items 
representing all possible forms of inner experience at a particular moment (Stone, 
Kessler, & Haythornthwaite, 1991). Hence, it is likely that participants are unable to 
report experiences or events that are not mentioned on the list. Repeated responding to 
the same questionnaire may sensitize participants to the type of events represented on the 
questionnaires, making participants more likely to report them. Additionally, participants 
are not consistent about reporting data in a timely fashion. The paper and pencil version 
of the Experience Sampling Form makes it difficult to ensure timely responding by the 
participant (Barrett & Barrett, 2001).  Hormuth (1986) and Csikszentmihalyi and Larson 
(1984) found that approximately 80%-90% of participants admitted occasionally to 
responding as much as 18 minutes after the cued signal. Such delays could increase the 
chances of memory and retrospective errors. Using an electronic device such as a palm 
top computer increases the likelihood of timely reporting as it provides time stamps that 
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record whether the data was collected in a timely fashion (Barrett & Barrett, 2001), 
however, it does not ensure timely reporting. 
Descriptive Experience Sampling 
 Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993) is a qualitative 
method used to develop high fidelity descriptions of inner experience.  Participants 
collect inner experience data in their natural settings.  Participants wear a beeper and are 
instructed to pay attention to whatever is in their awareness at the moment immediately 
prior to the beep.  As soon as the participant notes what was in his or her inner 
experience, the participant jots down notes about the characteristics of their experience in 
a notebook.  Typically, the participant will collect a certain number of moments (usually 
five or six beeps) and then take part in an intensive expositional interview within 24 
hours of when the beeps are collected.   
A trained DES investigator conducts the expositional interview, striving to gain 
an accurate understanding of the participant‘s experience while limiting presuppositions.  
At each interview, the participant is asked to describe the split-second experience 
immediately prior to the signal of the beep and to work together with the investigator to 
understand the details of the experience.  Furthermore, the investigator works 
collaboratively with the participant to develop descriptions of the experience that capture 
the original experience as fully as possible.  A participant can decline to discuss any 
moment of experience that they consider to be too private to talk about.  Following 
sufficient exploration of the experience, the investigator summarizes the moment to the 
participant.  If some details are missed or a discrepancy exists, then the interview will 
continue until satisfactory agreement about the experience has been reached.  
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Typically, a participant will require one sampling day to be trained in attending to 
and reporting thorough descriptions of each moment.  Sampling with each participant 
will usually occur over three to eight sessions.  Once a sufficient number of moments of 
experience have been collected, the investigator will attempt to identify salient 
characteristics of the participant. 
Thus, DES is an idiographic procedure that attempts to characterize one 
individual‘s experience.  DES can also be used to identify salient characteristics of 
participants who share a similar psychiatric diagnosis or other feature in common.  To 
accomplish this, the investigator samples with a number of participants and creates 
idiographic profiles for each participant.  These idiographic profiles are carefully 
inspected to determine if there are shared characteristics across participants.  If an 
experience appears to be common among the group, the investigator can generate a 
nomothetic characterization of the group‘s inner experience.  
DES and other sampling methodologies differ on several fronts. The participant‘s 
inner experience as it naturally occurs to them is the primary focus of DES.  For instance, 
ESM is interested in other aspects of awareness such as social or environmental context, 
activities, or other characteristics of interest as the focus of investigation a priori.  
Furthermore, ESM requires participants to provide responses via a structured format, 
often requiring participants to answer items via Likert scales.  Some research designs 
involving ESM do not actually investigate the participant‘s thinking, but rather measure 
the participant‘s mood, quality of life, and physical concerns.  DES does not require 
participants to complete questionnaires at each moment; rather DES asks the participants 
to focus solely on the split second of experience that was ongoing when the beep 
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sounded.  DES then employs an open-ended process to capture that experience whereby 
the participant takes unstructured notes about the experience and then participates in an 
unstructured expositional interview.  Furthermore, DES does not require the participant 
to pay attention to their social, environment, or physical characteristics unless that is part 
of the inner experience for the participant at that moment.  In addition, DES reports are 
analyzed qualitatively rather than quantitatively (Hurlburt, 1997). 
DES has been applied to many psychiatric groups (e.g., bulimia, schizophrenia, 
aspergers syndrome, anxiety), however only a handful of studies have looked at the inner 
experience of those who suffer from depression (Hurlburt, 1993; Perlotto, 2001; Gunter, 
2008).  Of the few studies applied to depressed populations, the sample sizes have been 
relatively small.   
Hurlburt (1993) explored the inner experience of three individuals suffering from 
various levels of depression and one individual who experienced hypomanic periods.  
Hurlburt reported five salient characteristics. The first observation made by Hurlburt was 
that as depressive symptoms increase, there is a decrease in the frequency of experiencing 
inner symbolization.  In other words, as the depressed individuals became more 
depressed, they experienced less inner speech and inner seeing while simultaneously 
having an increase in experiences of unsymbolized thoughts.  The second characteristic 
noted was that as depression increased; the individual experienced less clarity in their 
inner seeing.  Participants reported very detailed inner seeing experiences when not 
depressed, suggesting that during depression they were experiencing cloudiness or that 
the inner perception process became unclear.  The third observation was that depressed 
participants had difficulty differentiating perceptual from conceptual descriptions.  
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During the interview, participants reported inner seeing in their moment, however, when 
probed carefully, experiences tended to not be inner seeing at all.  The fourth 
characteristic observed was the inconstancy of the perceiver, as the participant reported 
having distinctly different mental states associated with different thoughts.  Hurlburt 
suggested that depressed individuals might not have a clear, stable platform from which 
to observe their own experiences.  The fifth observation was that emotional processing 
was sometimes experienced outside of the participant‘s awareness.  Participants 
frequently reported emotional processing in their body; however, they did not recognize 
these emotions in their awareness at the moment of the beep.  Another interesting finding 
was that all depressed participants were able to recognize their affect was changing, but 
did not recognize their cognitions were also changing along with changes in their affect.  
Perlotto (2001) explored the inner experience of three depressed participants and 
a control group.  Participants completed DES, gathering six beeps per day for 
approximately five days.  The depressed group frequently experienced feelings, sensory 
awareness, and unsymbolized thinking.  However, those experiences did not occur 
significantly more frequently than in the control group.  The control group frequently 
experienced feelings, sensory awareness, and images.  The depressed group reported 
more multiple experiences per beep and a higher percentage of feelings per sample 
compared to the control group.  The feelings moments the depressed group had a much 
greater ratio of negative to positive feelings (4:1 ratio) compared to the control group (1:1 
ratio).  
Gunter (2008) explored the inner experience of six depressed and four 
nondepressed participants.  Participants completed a SCID interview, filled out 
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questionnaires (Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression, BDI-II, Cognitive 
Triad Inventory, Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, and Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire), and completed DES over four sampling days.  Independent raters 
examined each beep summary for depressive content, anxiety content, and valence and 
rated the moment on Likert scales.  Depressed participants experienced less frequent 
inner speech and more feelings than nondepressed participants.  The ratings indicated 
depressed participants had more depressive content, anxiety content, and overall 
negative experiences within their sampled moments than did the control participants.  
Salient characteristics of the depressed participants‘ sampled moments appeared to be 
depressive content, depressive feelings, anxiety content, anxiety feelings, a propensity 
for overall negative experiences, and more highs and lows in everyday experiences.  
 
Methodological Advantages of DES 
The methods reviewed in the above section address some of the methodological 
concerns relevant to understanding inner experience.  DES‘s conservative and stringent 
approach to obtaining faithful accounts of an individual‘s inner experience helps 
minimize many of the common methodological concerns surrounding inner experience 
sampling, such as errors in retrospective self-reports.  DES is target specific, in that it 
requires the participant to attend to a specific moment in time marked by the onset of the 
beeper.  This target specificity reduces errors associated with semantic memory. 
Furthermore, DES minimizes errors associated with memory capacity as it is interested in 
brief moments (one second or less) of experience.  DES asks participants to record their 
inner experience immediately following its occurrence, which minimizes the loss of 
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information or adulterations due to state dependent recall.  During the expositional 
interview participants are asked to provide a full account of their momentary experience 
to the interviewer.  However, in order to reduce reactivity, participants are expressly 
discouraged from reaching beyond the captured experience and inferring what their 
experience meant or exploring reasons for why they may have experienced a 
phenomenon.  The interviewer cautiously asks questions that helps the subject to 
authentically reveal his/her inner experience and avoids asking questions that are leading 
or laced with the interviewer‘s presuppositions about how a phenomenon ought to occur. 
Lastly, DES is an ecologically valid method where the participants collect momentary 
inner experiences in their natural environment while going about their normal day.  
 
Cognitive Theories of Depression 
In the last half-century, numerous models have been proposed to explain the onset 
and maintenance of depressive symptoms.  Proposed models include the catecholamine 
(Schildkraut, 1965), behavioral (Lewinsohn, 1974), self-control (Rehm, 1977), 
ruminative response (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), cognitive (Beck, 1967), and helplessness-
hopelessness (Seligman, 1975; Abramson et al., 1989) models. Since introspective-
sampling research primarily deals with inner life, the cognitive and helplessness-
hopelessness models of depression appear to have the most relevance.  Cognitive theories 
of depression describe the nature of cognitive experiences which accompany and 
potentially contribute to depression.  Below I review the cognitive and helplessness-
hopelessness models of depression, which focus on the role of cognition in the etiology, 
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maintenance, and treatment of depression.  Following each models description I will 
review relevant research that utilizes sampling methodologies.  
Beck’s Cognitive Theory of Depression 
 According to Beck (1967), depressive symptoms can be triggered by a negative 
event.  During the encoding of stimuli, an individual‘s brain automatically activates a 
schema that helps process the information quickly.  If the individual‘s brain automatically 
activates a maladaptive schema, then the person may encode the negative event in a 
dysfunctional way.  A dysfunctional interpretation of a negative event can lead the 
individual to inappropriately assign themes of inadequacy, loss, blame, failure, and 
worthlessness to themselves.  As these negative themes are experienced within a person‘s 
cognitions, it can lead the person to feel, behave, and think in ways that are consistent 
with the DSM-IV-TR‘s diagnosis of a major depressive episode.  Thus, depression is 
activated and maintained by way of dysfunctional thinking patterns.   
Beck theorized that there are four different cognitive components that are 
susceptible to dysfunctional thinking. The four components that comprise Beck‘s theory 
are depressive self-schemas, distortions and biases, negative automatic thoughts, and 
cognitive triad of thinking.  Each component will be described in turn. 
 A schema is a mental model that an individual has developed in order to organize 
and process experiences efficiently.  Schemas are developed out of past experiences and 
beliefs related to a specific stimulus.  Once a specific stimulus has occurred, an 
individual‘s schema will set off automatic scripts and behavioral action sequences that 
allow him/her to respond quickly.  These scripts and behavior sequences provide the 
individual with information related to his/her attributes and abilities.  Typically, 
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individuals will develop schemas for events that are experienced by the majority of 
society.  However, an individual also develops schemas that are unique to him/herself; 
these are called self-schemas. 
 Self-schemas are self-focused and distinctive to the individual. They are regarded 
as hypothetical constructs that can account for repetitive patterns in an individual‘s 
thought content.  Specifically, when the self-schema is activated by a particular stimulus, 
the schema abstracts and shapes the raw information into thoughts or cognitions.  
Typically the content of the schemas take the form of generalizations that represent the 
individual‘s attitudes, goals, values, and ideas.   
 Self-schemas start to develop in early childhood (Millon & Blaney, 1999).  
Similar to personality, once a particular self-schema has developed, it becomes embedded 
in the individual and is resistant to change (Beck, 1964).  In psychopathology, the orderly 
matching of stimulus and schema fails because of the intrusion of hyperactive 
idiosyncratic schemas (Beck, 1964).  As a result of the increased meaningfulness placed 
on a maladaptive schema, the maladaptive schema tends to take over for the more 
appropriate schema.  This results in interpretations of events that deviate from reality 
(Beck, 1964).   
 Depressed individuals typically exhibit rigid patterns of thinking and cognitive 
distortions.  According to Beck, as depression develops, the dominance of idiosyncratic 
schemas is attributed to the increase in degree and frequency of cognitive distortions. As 
depression progresses, negative schemas become more active and become evoked by 
information that may be incongruent with them. The activation happens because unlike 
most people‘s interpretation of a situation, negative schemas will extract information 
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from the environment that is congruent with them and mold it to fit the negative schema. 
All types of individuals are susceptive to developing a depressive schema; however, this 
schematic formation is more characteristic of depressed individuals. 
 Social stressors are the typical stimuli that activate and lead to the development of 
depressive self-schemas (Beck, 1967).  As more and more depressive self-schemas are 
activated, the individual will experience more depressive symptomotology.  The presence 
of depressive self-schemas has been widely tested in research (Allen et al., 1996).   
Embedded in depressive self-schemas are what Beck called ―dysfunctional 
attitudes‖ (Beck, 1967).  Dysfunctional attitudes are the term used to describe the 
distorted patterns of thinking that contributes to depressive self-schemas.  Dysfunctional 
attitudes occur in the cognitive processing of a negative stimulus.  People experiencing 
depressive symptoms are prone to a variety of dysfunctional attitudes.  Beck identified 
four general categories of dysfunctional attitudes: arbitrary inference, selective 
abstraction, overgeneralization, and minimization and magnification (Beck, 1964). 
Arbitrary inference occurs when an individual draws negative conclusions about 
an event without support for those inferences.  Selective abstraction occurs when an 
individual focuses on the negative in a situation while disregarding the rest of the context.  
Another dysfunctional attitude identified by Beck is overgeneralization, which is the 
tendency to assume that failure at one task predisposes one to fail at all related/similar 
tasks encountered.  Minimizing events is the tendency to experience little 
accomplishment following completion of a difficult task and magnifying events occurs 
when an individual experiences a minor setback, yet considers it a major failure.  
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As these dysfunctional attitudes overtake an individual‘s processing of 
information a systematic bias occurs in the content of the individual‘s cognitions.  Beck 
theorized that depressed individuals generate excessive negative cognitions as a response 
to a negative event.  This overactive cognitive tendency is referred to as negative 
automatic thoughts.  Negative automatic thoughts are the negative beliefs and meanings 
assigned to events and usually represent thoughts about worthlessness or hopelessness, or 
general self-derogatory beliefs or reenactments of past failures or stressful situations.   
Typically negative automatic thoughts take the form of overly pessimistic views 
of oneself, one‘s world, and one‘s future, which is referred to as the cognitive triad of 
thinking.  The cognitive triad of thinking theory postulates that a depressed person will 
interpret stimuli regarding themselves, their environment, and predictions about the 
future in a depressive manner, such as personal deficiency, self-blame, and negative 
expectations (Beck, 1964).  Accordingly, people who are experiencing depression 
frequently feel deprived or defeated in their experiences, feel worthless, and often see 
their future as hopeless.  
As the four components of Beck‘s cognitive theory of depression are activated a 
person will experience sadness or other symptoms of depression. Once a pattern of 
depressive interpretations overtakes the individual‘s cognitions for the majority of 
situations they encounter, it will lead to the activation and maintenance of depressive 
symptomotology.  
Sampling Research Exploring Beck’s Cognitive Theory of Depression 
 To date, three sampling studies have explored components of Beck‘s Cognitive 
Theory of Depression.  Cavenagh (2003) explored the presence of the cognitive triad in 
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depressed participants experiences via DES.  Husky, Mazure, Maciejewski, and 
Swendsen (2007) explored the sociotropic/autonomic subtype of Beck‘s theory using 
ESM.  Gunter (2008) used DES to identify whether the components of Beck‘s theory 
were evidenced in moment-to-moment experiences of depressed individuals.   
Cavenagh (2003) recruited three participants who had a very high negative 
attributional style and three participants who had a non-negative attributional style.  
Participants completed four days of DES.  Two of the six participants were determined to 
be at high risk for depression (one from each group).  Individual beeps were coded on a 
Likert scale for evidence of the cognitive triad (an overly pessimistic view of oneself, 
one‘s world, and one‘s future).  The depressed participants evidenced more moment-to-
moment experiences of the cognitive triad than did the nondepressed participants.  
Cavenagh suggested that Beck‘s cognitive triad appears more frequently in the 
experiences of depressed participants.   
 Husky, Mazure, Maciejewski, and Swendsen (2007) used ESM to explore 
depressed mood in sociotropic and autonomic individuals.  The authors hypothesized that 
sociotropic individuals (high levels of dependence and excessive need to please others) 
would experience more depressed mood following a negative interpersonal event, 
whereas autonomic individuals (self-governing, independent) would experience more 
depressed mood following a negative achievement related event.  The study consisted of 
179 participants who filled out self-report questionnaires regarding mood and cognitive 
vulnerability (attributional style and sociotropy-autonomy).  Participants were required to 
complete the ESM over seven consecutive days.  Swendsen reported that sociotropy was 
an indirect determinant of depressed mood and appeared to support causal mediation and 
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specificity.  Though the sample as a whole experienced more depressed mood following a 
negative event, the relationship appeared to be much stronger with sociotropic 
individuals.  Sociotropy was found to have an impact on a participant‘s mood following a 
negative social event.  However, autonomy did not directly affect a participant‘s mood 
following negative-achievement related events. 
Gunter (2008) examined the cognitive theory of depression using DES.  Six 
depressed and four nondepressed undergraduates participated in the study.  Each 
participant completed questionnaires consistent with Beck‘s theory (BDI-II, Cognitive 
Triad Inventory, Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, and Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire) 
and four days of DES.  Following the participants‘ completion of the study, sampled 
moments were rated on Likert scales by independent raters for experiences of depressive 
content, the cognitive triad, dysfunctional attitudes, and automatic thoughts. The ratings 
indicated depressed participants had more frequent experiences of depressive content, the 
cognitive triad, dysfunctional attitudes, and automatic thoughts within their sampled 
moments than did the control participants.  However, only the depression construct 
showed a statistically significant difference between the groups.  The other constructs 
showed a large effect size in the expected direction.  Participants‘ overall scores on the 
questionnaires correlated with the corresponding rated construct on depressive content, 
the cognitive triad, and automatic thoughts.  However, further analyses suggested that 
these constructs were highly intercorrelated.  This study suggests that individual 
components of Beck‘s theory can be found in moment-to-moment experiences but the 
components may not be distinct. 
 
  52 
 
Helplessness-Hopelessness Theory of Depression 
The learned helplessness theory of depression (Seligman, 1975) states that people 
become depressed when they believe that they are no longer in control over 
reinforcements in their lives and that they are responsible for this lack of control.  
Seligman derived his theory through animal experiments.  Specifically, he administered 
unavoidable shocks to dogs and observed a steady decrease in escape and avoidant 
behavior over time.  Furthermore the dogs exhibited more passivity, weight loss, and a 
decrease in appetite.  These findings were seen as a parallel to the symptoms that 
precipitate depression.   
The theory was revised in 1978 to focus on an individual‘s attribution of 
responsibility for a negative event as the primary source in the development of depressive 
symptoms (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).  Specifically, depressive vulnerable 
individuals attribute internal, stable, global causes to negative outcomes and external, 
unstable, and specific causes to positive outcomes.  In other words, following a failure, 
the depressive-vulnerable individual will take responsibility and assume the cause is 
general and persisting.  After a successful outcome, the depressive-vulnerable individual 
will not take credit and assume that the outcome does not have any bearing on their 
behavior or for the future. 
The theory was revised a third time by Abramson et al., (1989).  Abramson et al., 
(1989) suggested that depression only resulted after an individual experienced a sense of 
hopelessness.  This theory views both anxiety and depression as being characterized by 
helplessness, but only depression is characterized by hopelessness.  The hopelessness 
attribution style cannot occur without first experiencing helplessness; therefore anxiety 
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symptoms are common within depression syndromes.  Symptoms of anxiety are the 
initial mood reaction to a negative outcome and in turn can cause the individual to 
experience hopelessness if s/he views the event as stable and global.  Furthermore, 
individuals with depressogenic attributional styles are more likely to attribute negative 
events to stable and global causes; therefore they are at increased risk to experience 
hopelessness depression.   
Sampling Research Exploring the Helplessness-Hopelessness Theory of Depression 
Five studies have explored components of the helplessness-hopelessness theory of 
depression utilizing sampling methodologies.  Swendsen (1997) categorized 44 
participants low in depressive and anxiety symptomotology into two groups consisting of 
low or high risk attributional styles for depression.  Participants were signaled via a 
beeper five times a day for a one-week period.  Following a signal the participant 
completed an experience sampling form made up of items assessing attribution styles, 
daily life events, and anxious and depressed moods.  The participant‘s attributional (e.g., 
depressogenic) style predicted momentary causal attributions.  Furthermore, a hopeless 
causal attribution for a minor negative event predicted changes in residual depressed 
mood.  After the experience of a negative event, causal attributions of globality and 
stability explained the increase in depressed mood.  Swendsen found a difference 
between anxiety and depressive symptoms regarding attribution styles which was 
consistent with the theory‘s assertion that negative outcome expectancy is unique to 
depression.  However, Swendsen did not find support for the claim that helplessness 
expectancy consistently predicted anxiety.  The results of this study provide support for 
the helplessness-hopelessness theory of depression. 
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 Swendsen (1998) examined idiographic and cross-situational data in hopes of 
validating the helplessness-hopelessness theory.  Ninety-one participants completed ESM 
five times per day for seven consecutive days.  Attributional and perception of control 
styles were assessed via questionnaires.  Questionnaires were made up of items assessing 
anxious and depressed moods, daily life events, and specific attributions made to those 
events.  The author did not find a link between attributional and perception of control 
styles with regard to negative events predicting the onset of depressive symptoms.  
Attributional and perception of control styles predicted causal attributions and 
perceptions of control across the daily flow of environmental contexts.  Specific causal 
attributions of negative events were more predictive of fluctuations in depressed mood 
than the individual‘s daily experience.  A highly specific timeframe for testing theories of 
depression was suggested by Swendsen.  Specifically, stable and global causal 
attributions were observed to have greatest influence on the individual immediately after 
the negative event.  Typically, this attributional style subsequently influenced mood for 
up to six hours afterward.   
Swendsen (2000) explored the cross-cultural validity of the helplessness-
hopelessness theory of depression via ESM.  Participants were 90 French people and 43 
Americans.  Participants were signaled five times per day for one-week to complete 
questionnaires.  The questionnaires consisted of the Inventory of Small Life Events, 
attributional styles, and BDI.  After completion of the questionnaire items participants 
evaluated the event that had the biggest impact on them.  Participants rated this event on 
seven-point Likert scales regarding the event‘s stability, globality, and internality.  
Results indicated differences between cultures with regard to average severity of daily 
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negative events, depressed moods, and causal attributions.  Specifically, French 
participants reported more negativity about daily negative events, but attributed fewer 
causal attributions to themselves compared to the Americans.  Depression levels were not 
found to be different across cultures. 
Cavenagh (2003) explored the experience of three individuals with negative 
attributional styles and three with non-negative attributional styles as determined by the 
Attributional Styles Questionnaire.  Participants completed four days of DES.  Their 
moments of experience were then coded for attributional style by the author.  The author 
did not find any significant difference between the attributional styles reflected in the 
moments of experience between the two groups of participants.   
Husky, Mazure, Maciejewski, and Swendsen (2007) hypothesized that depressed 
attributional styles would predict more negative causal attributions to negative events 
throughout the day and, as a result these specific attributions, would be associated with 
increases in depressed mood.  One hundred and seventy-nine participants completed self-
report questionnaires regarding mood and cognitive vulnerability (attributional style and 
sociotropy-autonomy).  Participants then took part in ESM over seven consecutive days.  
Attributional style was found to be an indirect determinant of depressed mood.  
Furthermore, attributional style supported causal mediation and specificity.  Attributional 
style predicted the differing levels of specific attributions to the variety of negative events 
experienced in daily life.  The moment-to-moment cognitions were able to explain the 
variance in depressed mood.  The authors further explained that the helplessness-
hopelessness theory of depression was able to explain a larger portion of variance in 
depressed mood overall than the cognitive theory of depression. 
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Present Study 
The present study employed Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) to explore 
the inner experience of depressed individuals and a comparison group of nondepressed 
individuals.  The inner experience of the depressed individuals also was examined to 
determine the extent to which it reflected or was consistent with cognitive theories of 
depression and the inner experience of the two groups was compared.  The study 
involved three phases: Screening, Qualification, and Sampling.  During the Screening 
Phase, approximately 226 university students were administered the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977).  Participants who 
scored high on the CES-D were asked to take part in the Qualification Phase.  Similarly, 
participants who scored low on the CES-D were asked to take part in the Qualification 
Phase to identify nondepressed participants for a comparison group. During this phase, 
participants were administered the mood disorders module of the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis 1 Disorders (SCID).  Participants who met criteria for a 
diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder according to the SCID were asked to participate 
in the Sampling Phase.  Likewise, participants who were identified as low in depressive 
symptomatology and did not meet criteria for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder 
according to the SCID were asked to participate in the Sampling Phase. During the 
Sampling Phase of the study participants took part in DES.  Participants were asked to 
collect six beeps per day over four sampling days.  Within 24 hours of when the samples 
of inner experience were collected an expositional interview was conducted and the 
participants were asked to describe their inner experience at the moment of each beep and 
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to collaborate with the interviewer(s) to understand the details of each moment of inner 
experience.  In addition participants completed the CES-D before each interview to 
assess changes in depressive symptoms.  After each sampling interview, the interviewer 
prepared a written description of each moment of the participant‘s inner experience.  
After data collection was complete, the investigators reviewed the written 
descriptions of the moments of inner experience to develop an approach for 
characterizing the moments of inner experience. The investigators decided to code each 
moment of inner experience.  A set of codes was developed that included the five most 
common characteristics of inner experience based on prior DES studies (Heavey & 
Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002), other common phenomena of experience 
encountered in prior DES studies of depressed individuals, and codes for experiential 
symptoms and constructs discussed in the broader literature on depression (e.g., 
depressed mood/sadness, fatigue, anxiety, Negative Cognitive Triad).  A complete 
description of the codes used is presented in the Method section.   
Gunter and Heavey coded each moment of experience for several of the 
participants and then reviewed the process, discussed disagreements and refined the 
codes.  After this process of refining the codes, Gunter and Heavey independently coded 
each moment of experience for all of the participants.  These codes were then reviewed to 
assess the reliability of the coding process.  Disagreements were reviewed to develop a 
consensus coding of each moment of experience.  The consensus codes for each moment 
were then analyzed to look at within group similarity and variability as well as between 
group differences.  Similarly, self-report scores via the CES-D were compared with 
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relevant coding constructs to look at within group similarity and variability as well as 
between group differences. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
 
 This study consisted of three phases: a Screening Phase which identified people 
who had elevated levels of depressive symptoms and others who had minimal symptoms 
of depression; a Qualification Phase which determined if participants met DSM-IV-TR 
criteria for a major depressive episode or were free of depression and therefore could 
serve as a comparison group; and a Sampling Phase which explored the inner experience 
of individuals suffering from depression and a nondepressed comparison group.   
 
Screening Phase 
Participants   
The participants in this phase were made up of 226 Spring 2009, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas undergraduate Introduction to Psychology students.  Participants 
were given psychology research participation credits. 
Instruments 
 The demographic questionnaire contained the following items: name, address, 
email address, phone number, cell phone number, age, race, sex, marital status, education 
level, and employment status. 
The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) 
was designed to screen for depressive symptoms as well as to assess change in symptom 
severity over time.  It is a 20 item self-report questionnaire that takes about 10 minutes to 
complete.  Participants read each item and determined the extent that the statement 
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described how they felt during the past week. Participants rated items on a Likert scale 
ranging from zero to three.  Upon completion of the questionnaire, the participant total 
score ranged from zero to 60.  Scores between 16 and 26 indicate mild depression and 
scores of 27 or more indicate major depression (Zich et al., 1990; Ensel, 1986)  The 
internal consistency coefficient alpha of the CES-D has ranged from .85 to .90 (Radloff, 
1977).  Test-retest reliability for two and eight week periods was found to be between .51 
and .67, respectively (Radloff, 1977).  The CES-D has shown good convergent validity as 
it has correlated highly with other depression scales such as the Beck Depression 
Inventory and the Zung Depression Scale.    
Procedure 
 Researchers recruited participants by advertising the study in Psychology 101 
classes at the University of Nevada Las Vegas.  At the end of the students‘ class period 
the researcher provided a brief description of the study. Volunteers completed the 
informed consent, the demographic questionnaire and the CES-D in exchange for 0.5 
psychology research credits.  
 
Qualification Phase 
Participants 
 Undergraduate students with the highest and lowest scores on the CES-D were 
contacted to participate in the Qualification Phase.  This phase continued until eighteen 
participants qualified and agreed to participate in the Sampling Phase. Thirty-three people 
were invited to participate in the Depressed sample.  Two people declined to participate 
and seven people did not respond to a phone message or email left by the researcher.  Of 
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the 24 participants who were interviewed for the Depressed group, ten qualified for the 
Sampling Phase of the study, and nine chose to participate.  Twenty-three people were 
invited to participate in the Nondepressed sample.  Three people declined to participate 
and eight people did not respond to a phone message or email left by the researcher.  Of 
the 11 participants who were interviewed for the Nondepressed group, all eleven 
qualified for the Sampling Phase of the study, and nine chose to participate.  Participants 
were given one hour of course research credit for their participation in the Qualification 
Phase.   
Instrument 
 The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 1 Disorders (SCID; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams 2002) is a semi-structured diagnostic interview intended to 
help clinicians, researchers, and trainees make reliable DSM-IV-TR psychiatric 
diagnoses.  The full-length version of the SCID can take between one to two hours to 
complete if the participant meets criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis.  A nonpsychiatric 
participant may complete the interview within 30 to 90 minutes.  Only the mood 
disorders module and brief psychotic screen of the SCID were administered; participants 
generally completed the interview within 30 to 45 minutes.  Zanarini et al., (2000) has 
shown the SCID to be a reliable and valid measure for a diagnosis of Major Depressive 
Disorder.  Specifically, correlation coefficients for interrater reliability were found to be 
.80 and test-retest reliability for a seven to 10 day period was .61.  
Procedure 
 Participants who met the screening criteria completed an informed consent form.  
The SCID was administered to each participant by either Jedidiah Gunter or Noelle 
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Lefforge, a fellow graduate student working in the DES lab.  Following the SCID 
interview, participants were notified if they met inclusion criteria to take part in the 
Sampling Phase.  Those who met inclusion criteria for either the Depressed or 
Nondepressed group were invited to participate in the Sampling Phase of the study.   
 
Sampling Phase 
Participants  
As measured by the SCID, nine undergraduate students who were suffering from 
major depression but not a psychotic disorder and nine undergraduate students who did 
not meet diagnostic criteria for any mood or psychotic disorder participated in the 
Sampling Phase.  Each participant earned five psychology participation research credits.   
The average age of the depressed participants was 20.78 years, with a range of 18 
to 30.  Six of the participants were female and three were male.  Three of the participants 
were Asian, two Hispanic, one Caucasian, one biracial, one Chicana and one multiracial.  
The sample consisted of four freshman, two sophomores, two juniors, and one participant 
whose year in school was unknown. One of the participants had been married, one had 
been divorced, and seven had never been married.  Two of the participants were 
employed part-time and one was employed full-time. Four of the participants had 
received therapy in the past. The average score on the CES-D during the Qualification 
Phase was 35.  None of the depressed participants were taking psychiatric medications. 
The average time to complete sampling was 25.1 days with a range of 9 to 44 days. 
The average age of the nondepressed participants was 20.10 years, with a range of 
18 to 27.  Five of the participants were female and four were male.  Two of the 
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participants were Asian, one Hispanic, four Caucasian, and two Mexican.  The sample 
consisted of three freshman, two sophomores, one senior and three participants whose 
year in school was unknown. One of the participants was married and eight had never 
been married.  Four of the participants were employed full-time. One of the participants 
had received therapy in the past. The average score on the CES-D during the 
Qualification Phase was 2.13, with one missing entry.  None of the nondepressed 
participants were taking psychiatric medications. The average time to complete sampling 
was 16.3 days with a range of 7 to 34 days.  The difference between the groups for 
average time to complete sampling was not statistically significant, t (16) = 1.85, p = .08, 
but the effect size of the difference was large, d = .87. 
Equipment and Instruments 
A pocket-sized beeper and an earphone were provided to each participant.  The 
beeper was programmed to emit a 700-Hz tone/beep at random intervals ranging from 
immediate to 60 minutes with a mean length of 30 minutes.  This beep was heard through 
the provided earphone.  Additionally, a pocket-sized notebook was provided to each 
participant.  The notebook was used to jot down notes about his/her inner experience at 
beeped moments.  The CES-D was used to measure ongoing depressive symptoms. 
Procedure 
 Participants were notified immediately after the Qualification Phase if they met 
inclusion criteria for the Sampling Phase.  Participants who met inclusion criteria were 
invited to meet with the investigator.  The investigator explained the Sampling Phase of 
the study including possible benefits of participating, the procedure, and the required time 
commitment.  If interested in completing the Sampling Phase, the participants were told 
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about the limits of confidentiality and their ability to terminate the study at any point.  
After the investigator addressed any questions or concerns the participant had, the 
participant provided informed consent.   
Following completion of the informed consent, participants were given instruction 
on the DES procedure including instructions on how to operate the beeper and wear the 
earphone.  Specifically, instructions were provided on how to turn the beeper on and off, 
adjust the volume, and reset the beeper by pressing a button.  Additionally, each 
participant was given a pocket-sized notebook and instructed to take notes on their inner 
experience after each beep.  Participants were instructed to turn on the beeper as they 
went about their normal daily activities.  They were asked to do this no more than 
twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled expositional interview.  Following a beep, the 
participants were instructed to jot down notes in their notebook about their inner 
experience that was ongoing just as the beep began, which we call the moment of the 
beep.  If a beep captured a moment that the participant did not want to share with the 
investigator, the participants were told they could decline discussion of that beep.  
Further, they were told that if there was any aspect of a beep they did not want to discuss, 
they should decline to discuss the entire beep so as to avoid incomplete descriptions of 
any moment.  They were asked to repeat this process of the beep sounding and taking 
notes on their ongoing inner experience until they had collected six moments of inner 
experience.  Once the instructions were completed and questions about the procedure 
answered, the investigator scheduled a time to meet at the Experience Sampling Lab for 
an expositional interview.  
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The 1-hour expositional interviews were conducted by Jedidiah Gunter or Noelle 
Lefforge, a fellow graduate student working in the DES lab. Four of the depressed 
participants and five of the nondepressed participants were interviewed by Jedidiah 
Gunter. Noelle Lefforge interviewed five depressed participants and four nondepressed 
participants.  Christopher Heavey filled in when the primary investigator was unable to 
make an appointment and he also co-investigated in some of the interviews. These 
interviews were audiotaped or videotaped.  During the expositional interview, the 
participants were instructed to provide a faithful description of their inner experience at 
the moment of beep.  The interviewer asked questions to help the participant with this 
task.  The participant and interviewer worked together as a team to apprehend the details 
of the participant‘s ongoing inner experience at each beep.  Once all six beeps were 
discussed, the participant was asked to repeat the process of collecting six beeps and 
participating in an expositional interview within 24 hours of beep collection.  In addition 
the participant completed the CES-D prior to each expositional interview to assess 
changes in depressive symptoms. 
The primary interviewer wrote a summary of each moment of experience within a 
24 hour period following the expositional interview.  Descriptions of each moment 
included a brief description of the context followed by a description of the participant‘s 
ongoing inner experience.  The primary interviewer reviewed the inner experience 
descriptions with Dr. Heavey. This procedure was repeated until each participant 
completed four expositional interviews for a total of approximately 24 sampled moments.  
The actual number of sampled moments across all participants was 412, 198 for the 
Depressed group and 214 for the Nondepressed group.   
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In typical DES studies, the first day of sampling is discarded as a training day.  
However, because of the exploratory nature of this study and the fact that the level of 
reported depressive symptomatology in the Depressed group declined substantially each 
day, it was decided to use the first day sampling results in this study.   
After data collection was complete, Dr. Heavey and Gunter reviewed the 
momentary experiences of all participants in order to develop an approach for 
characterizing the moments of inner experience. It was determined that Gunter and 
Heavey would code each moment of inner experience.  A set of operational definitions 
were developed for five different groups of phenomena or aspects of experience.  The 
first group included the five most common phenomena of inner experience based on prior 
DES studies (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002) and the coding 
instructions were based on the codebook developed by Hurlburt and Heavey (2006): 
1. Inner speech - is the experience of speaking words in the person's own voice, 
with the same vocal characteristics (timbre; rate; inflection for commas, question 
marks, etc.; pauses; accents; stutters; etc.) as the person's own external speech, but 
with no external (real) noise. In its pure form, the experience of inner speech is 
identical to that of external speech except that the mouth does not move and no 
external production of sound is produced. 
2. Inner Seeing - is the experience of seeing something that is known to be not 
actually present. In its pure form inner seeing has the same characteristics as 
seeing an external object: the center is in clearer focus, the focus or attention 
becomes less clear at the periphery; there is no distinct border or edge to the 
experience, and so on. 
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3. Unsymbolized thinking - is the experience of thinking some particular, definite 
thought without the awareness of that thought's being represented in words, 
images, or any other symbols. 
4. Feeling - is an emotional experience, including sadness, happiness, anxiety, joy, 
fear, nervousness, anger, embarrassment, and so on. 
5. Sensory Awareness - is a sensory or perceptual experience (itch, hotness, 
pressure, visual taking-in, hearing) that is itself a primary theme or focus for the 
subject. Such a sensory awareness may be bodily (itch, tingle, pain, pressure, 
hotness, coldness, shiver, stiffness, etc.) or external (noting the color of a flower, 
smelling gasoline, taking in the characteristics of a sunrise, hearing the scratching 
of the cat at the door, etc.) 
 
The second group of codes included a variety of common experiential symptoms 
of depression and related conditions.  These were coded based on the following 
operational definitions: 
6. Depression – The presence of feeling sad or despondent. 
7. Anxiety - The presence of apprehension or uneasiness. 
8. Body Discomfort – The awareness of physical pain or an unpleasant bodily 
sensation.  
9. Fatigue – feeling tired, exhausted, sleepy, etc.  
10. Boredom/Anhedonia - an unpleasant, transient affective state in which the 
individual feels a pervasive lack of interest in and difficulty concentrating on the 
current activity. 
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The third group of codes included judgments about the nature of the experience 
present as described below:  
11. Feeling Valence: When feelings were present, they were coded as being either 
negative (-1) or positive (1).  If feelings were mixed or neutral, they were coded 
as neutral (0). 
12. Overall Valence: For each moment we also coded the overall valence of the 
experience as negative (-1), neutral (0) or positive (1). 
 
Finally, we included a fourth group of codes where we tried to identify instances 
when the experience was consistent with or representative of a number of constructs 
discussed in the broader literature on depression (e.g., Negative Cognitive Triad, Beck, 
1964; Learned Helplessness Theory, Seligman, 1967).  We used the following 
operational definitions and coded each for presence (1) or absence (0). 
13. Cognitive Triad – Self: A negative view of the self. 
14. Cognitive Triad - World: A negative view of the world.  
15. Cognitive Triad - Future: A negative view of the future. 
16. Attribution: A thought about the cause of event.  We were also prepared to code 
attributions with regard to stability (stable vs. unstable), specificity (global vs. 
specific) and location of cause (internal vs. external), but we did not come to a 
consensus on identifying any moment of experience as representing attributions 
and thus these codes for the nature of an attribution were not used.   
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The final coding instructions were developed through multiple revisions by 
Heavey and Gunter.  The initial operational definitions of the constructs were developed 
based on the DES Codebook Manual of Terminology (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006), 
operational definitions from prior DES studies of depressed individuals, and a summary 
of the constructs from Cognitive Theories of Depression. Using these initial operational 
definitions, Gunter and Heavey coded each moment of experience for two of the 
participants and then reviewed the process, discussed disagreements, and adjusted the 
coding definitions accordingly.  Gunter and Heavey then coded the moments of 
experience for two more depressed and nondepressed participants and a preliminary 
reliability analysis between the two coders demonstrated sufficient reliability.  Once the 
operational definitions of the codes were fine-tuned, Gunter and Heavey independently 
coded the momentary experiences of the remaining twelve participants in a random order.   
After the coding was completed, the results were reviewed to assess the reliability 
of the coding process.  The following are the percentage agreement between the two 
raters: Inner Seeing = .98, Inner Speech = .99, Unsymbolized Thinking = .92, Feelings = 
.95, Feeling Valence = .95, Sensory Awareness = .93, Depression = .99, Anxiety = .98, 
Body Discomfort = .96, Fatigue = .99, Boredom/Anhedonia = .99, Content Valence = 
.92, Cognitive Triad – Self = .99, Cognitive Triad – World = .99, Cognitive Triad – 
Future = .99, Attribution = .99, Attribution – Stability = .99, Attribution – Control = .99, 
and Attribution – Locus of Causality = .99. Disagreements were reviewed to develop a 
consensus coding of each moment of experience.   
The consensus coding for each moment were then analyzed to look at within 
group similarity and variability as well as between group differences.  Independent -
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sample t tests were used to determine the extent that Depressed and Nondepressed group 
were significantly different in CES-D scores, DES-related phenomena, and constructs 
associated with depression-related literature. In some instances, CES-D scores within the 
Depressed group were correlated with the sampling results.  Effect sizes were calculated 
using Cohen‘s d. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents the depressed and nondepressed participants‘ self-reported 
depression score on the CES-D at each point of administration.  The group means and 
standard deviations also are presented.  As can be seen, there were substantial differences 
in the expected direction for self-reported depression, with the Depressed group 
endorsing higher rates of depressive symptomatology at all points compared to the 
Nondepressed group.  These differences were all statistically significant. 
Table 1: CES-D Scores 
CES-D Depressed 
Mean 
Depressed 
SD 
Nondepressed 
Mean 
Nondepressed 
SD 
t 
Value 
p 
Value 
Effect 
Size 
Phase 2 34.56 6.19 3.56 .88 14.88 <.0001 7.01 
Day 1 25.22 5.91 3.13 3.27 -9.35 <.0001 4.63 
Day 2 20.89 6.03 2.56 4.10 -7.54 <.0001 3.55 
Day 3 18.89 5.51 2.89 2.21 -8.09 <.0001 3.81 
Day 4 14.67 6.00 3.89 5.40 -4.01 .001 1.88 
 
Table 2 presents the percentage of sampled moments that contained each of the 
five most common phenomena of inner experience (inner speech, inner seeing, 
unsymbolized thought, feeling, and sensory awareness) for each participant as well as the 
means and standard deviations for the Depressed and Nondepressed groups.  As can be 
seen in Table 2, there was substantial within subject variability in the relative percentage 
of moment containing each of these five commonly occurring phenomena.  However, the 
average frequency of these five phenomena within the Depressed and Nondepressed 
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groups were very similar.  None of the differences in the mean frequency between groups 
were statistically significant.  
Table 2: Frequency of Five Common Phenomena of Inner Experience 
Participant Inner 
Speech 
Inner 
Seeing 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 
Feeling Sensory 
Awareness 
Depressed      
1 18% 9% 18% 9% 64% 
2 21% 5% 26% 0% 32% 
3 43% 0% 33% 14% 14% 
4 38% 29% 21% 38% 8% 
5 13% 21% 29% 13% 8% 
6 8% 50% 13% 29% 4% 
7 13% 29% 33% 33% 63% 
8 10% 29% 24% 43% 19% 
9 16% 21% 42% 58% 0% 
Mean 20% 21% 27% 26% 24% 
SD 12% 15% 9% 19% 24% 
Nondepressed      
1 38% 4% 33% 21% 50% 
2 4% 0% 17% 13% 8% 
3 8% 50% 13% 21% 13% 
4 9% 30% 48% 13% 9% 
5 13% 13% 42% 21% 8% 
6 25% 4% 29% 25% 63% 
7 9% 13% 13% 48% 39% 
8 17% 13% 38% 8% 21% 
9 8% 29% 54% 33% 4% 
Mean 14% 17% 32% 23% 24% 
SD 11% 15% 15% 12% 21% 
 
Table 3 presents the percentages of positive and negative feelings and judgments 
about the percentage of moments that have an overall positive or negative content for 
both the Depressed and Nondepressed groups.  No significant differences were found 
between groups regarding the frequency of positive feelings (d = .35), negative feelings 
(d = .74), positive content (d = .18), and negative content (d = .68).  Although both the 
Depressed and Nondepressed groups had a higher frequency of negative feelings than 
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positive feelings, the relative proportions were more extreme in the Depressed group, 
with a ratio of more than three times as many negative feelings as positive feelings, 
whereas the Nondepressed group had a ratio of less than one and a half times as many 
negative feelings as positive feelings.  Again, however, this difference in relative 
proportions of negative to positive feelings was not significant.  Both groups also had a 
higher frequency of overall negative content compared to positive content, and again the 
relative ratio was more extreme in the Depressed group, but this difference in proportions 
also  was not significant.  A small but nonsignificant correlation (r = .29, ns) was found 
in the Depressed group between the participant‘s percentage of moments containing 
negative feelings and his/her average CES-D score. 
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Table 3: Frequency of other Phenomena of Experience 
Participant Positive 
Feeling 
Negative 
Feeling 
Positive 
Content 
Negative 
Content 
Depressed     
1 0% 9% 0% 18% 
2 0% 0% 5% 21% 
3 0% 14% 10% 14% 
4 4% 25% 4% 58% 
5 0% 13% 8% 8% 
6 0% 29% 4% 46% 
7 13% 21% 13% 33% 
8 19% 24% 38% 38% 
9 16% 42% 32% 47% 
Mean 6% 20% 13% 32% 
SD 8% 12% 13% 6% 
Nondepressed     
1 0% 21% 0% 42% 
2 4% 8% 13% 8% 
3 4% 13% 8% 17% 
4 4% 9% 9% 39% 
5 8% 13% 13% 29% 
6 17% 8% 25% 17% 
7 26% 22% 30% 30% 
8 4% 4% 17% 25% 
9 17% 17% 17% 29% 
Mean 9% 13% 15% 26% 
SD 9% 6% 9% 11% 
 
 
Table 4 presents the percentages of moments of experience that contained 
depressive experience, anxiety, or possible symptoms of depression including body 
discomfort, fatigue, and boredom.  All of these types of experiences were infrequent, 
with none having a mean frequency higher than 9% of sampled moments.  Moments 
containing depressive experience were very infrequent among both depressed and 
nondepressed participants.  Although the mean frequency was higher for the Depressed 
group (4%) than the Nondepressed group (0.4%), the modal frequency for the Depressed 
 
  75 
 
group was 0%, with 6 participants having no samples containing depressive experience.  
The difference between the groups was not statistically significant, t (16) = 1.5, p = .15, 
but the effect size of the difference was medium, d = .71.   
The patterns for Anxiety and Fatigue were very similar, with the Depressed group 
having higher mean frequencies than the Nondepressed groups and the effect sizes for the 
differences being medium to large (d = .70 and .97, respectively) but the differences not 
reaching statistical significance (p = .16 and .06, respectively).  Again, for both Anxiety 
and Fatigue, the mean frequencies were low and the modal frequency was 0%.  The 
difference in the mean frequencies for Body Discomfort between the groups also was not 
statistically significant (p = .61) and it was small in magnitude (d = .25).  The minimal 
difference in the mean frequencies of Boredom was actually the reverse of the expected 
direction.  
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Table 4: Frequency of Depressive-Related Symptoms 
Participant Depression Anxiety Body 
Discomfort 
Fatigue Boredom 
 
Depressed      
1 0% 9% 14% 5% 0% 
2 0% 0% 11% 21% 0% 
3 0% 5% 0% 5% 5% 
4 0% 21% 0% 8% 0% 
5 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
6 4% 8% 13% 13% 0% 
7 0% 17% 13% 0% 0% 
8 14% 0% 5% 5% 10% 
9 16% 16% 11% 11% 0% 
Mean 4% 8% 8% 7% 2% 
SD 7% 8% 6% 7% 4% 
Nondepressed      
1 4% 0% 21% 8% 0% 
2 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
4 0% 4% 17% 0% 0% 
5 0% 4% 0% 0% 8% 
6 0% 4% 13% 0% 0% 
7 0% 17% 4% 9% 9% 
8 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 
9 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 
Mean .5% 4% 6% 2% 2% 
SD 1% 5% 9% 4% 4% 
 
 
Although six of the participants in the Depressed group did not have moments of 
depressive experience, three of the participants did have moments containing depressive 
experience.  Those three participants did not have higher average CES-D scores 
compared to the other depressed participants, falling third, fifth, and seventh highest 
within the Depressed group.  In total, there were seven moments containing elements of 
depression or sadness in the Depressed group (out of a total of 198 sampled moments) 
and one moment in the Nondepressed group (out of a total of 214 sampled moments).  
The following are the eight identified depressed moments in the study: 
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1. Depressed Participant 6, Day 2, Beep 1: He was driving his car to school.  He had 
just listened to a song that reminded him of his ex-girlfriend.  At the moment of 
the beep he was seeing his ex-girlfriend. He was thinking about her, what they 
had gone through, her and her new boyfriend, and whether she was happy.  He 
was feeling sad which he experienced as heavy pressure and difficulty breathing.  
The difficulty breathing was experienced as bubbling inwards and outwards of his 
chest. 
2. Depressed Participant 8, Day 1, Beep 1: She was watching TV, but not paying 
attention to it. At the moment of the beep, she was thinking about her schoolwork, 
how she was falling behind, and her grades were too low. These were ideas that 
were not in words or images. She may have been thinking these thoughts 
sequentially, but she could not remember which exact thought was present at the 
moment of the beep. She was feeling upset, down, stressed out, and tired which 
she experienced as related to the thought. She didn‘t want to do anything, which 
she experienced as both a thought and feeling. 
3. Depressed Participant 8, Day 1, Beep 4: She had an upsetting telephone 
conversation with her ex-boyfriend. At the moment of the beep, she was feeling a 
blended emotion of mostly anger with a little bit of sadness. She could not 
provide experiential details of this feeling, but she did experience it as related to 
her thoughts. She was thinking that she couldn‘t believe she was upset about it, 
that she shouldn‘t care, and that she wanted to punch something. These thoughts 
were all occurring together without images or words. There was a characteristic of 
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racing to her thinking. After the beep, she realized that at the moment she had her 
fists clenched, her heart was pounding, and she was crying. 
4. Depressed Participant 8, Day 3, Beep 3: She was singing along to an Akon song. 
At the moment of the beep, she was hearing the song playing out loud, singing it 
out loud, and hearing herself singing it. She was also feeling sad. The sadness was 
partially experienced as a physical sensation of emptiness in her stomach area. 
5. Depressed Participant 9, Day 1, Beep 1: He was at work and had run into a 
regular guest. The guest was telling him about his dad dying which made the 
participant think about his own dad‘s death. At the moment of the beep, he was 
feeling uncomfortable and nervous. This was experienced as a mild bubbliness in 
the middle of his abdomen (gut region) that was spreading outward. He was 
feeling sad, both for the guest and himself. He was unable to articulate how the 
sadness was in his awareness. It seemed to be experienced as related to a thought 
he was having. The thought was about if he would ever get over his dad‘s death. 
This thought was not in words or images. He was also hearing the guest talking, 
but not paying much attention to what he was saying. Looking back, he realized 
that he had been trying to pull away from the conversation. This was a very 
difficult moment for him to talk about. He said that he was having a similar 
experience of uncomfortable/nervousness and sadness as he was telling me about 
the moment. He appeared upset and approaching tears. He openly acknowledged 
the difficulty of talking about the moment, but when given an opportunity to omit 
its discussion, he opted to do his best to talk about it. 
 
  79 
 
6. Depressed Participant 9, Day 2, Beep 3: He had been watching Family Guy. In 
the show, they had just made a joke that the participant and his boyfriend often 
repeat. At the moment of the beep, he was saying out loud with lower volume 
than he would use in a conversation, ―Oh God, I miss Phil. (his boyfriend).‖ He 
was thinking about how his relationship eventually has to stop and that it is 
becoming pointless (because his boyfriend lives in another city). This thought was 
not in images or words. He was feeling of sad/hopeless which he experienced as 
related to the thought. There were no other experiential details of the feeling. 
7. Depressed Participant 9, Day 2, Beep 5: He has been watching Frasier but was not 
paying attention to the show at the moment of the beep. At the moment of the 
beep he was thinking about his stepmom. (He had found out a couple days ago 
that she had died about 8 months ago). He was innerly seeing a collage or rapid 
cycling of images related to his stepmom. He had difficulty articulating which 
images were present which seemed to be related to both them quickly coming in 
and out of awareness and the presence of multiple images at once. The images 
were related to various ideas of his stepmom; that he wasn‘t going to have another 
chance to talk to her; remembering laying on the couch watching TV with her; 
putting flowers on her grave when he goes to visit his family. At the same time, 
he was innerly smelling her fragrance. He was feeling sadness. After the beep, he 
realized that he had been tearing up. 
8. Nondepressed Participant 1, Day 2, Beep 4: The television show John and Kate 
plus 8 was on TV but at the moment she was feeling really sad/mopey/sluggish, 
which she experienced as her heart weighing more that it should.  She was feeling 
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sluggish in her whole body.  Connected to this feeling was the thought about her 
boyfriend and wondering what he was doing and if she should call him.  She was 
also aware of the television noise, but not paying attention to it. 
A feeling of sadness was a common element reflected in these moments.  In 
addition, seven of the eight moments included thoughts (i.e., inner speech, unsymbolized 
thinking, inner seeing) and six of those seven thoughts involved a significant person of 
his/her life. Four of these moments contained bodily sensations in the torso area, whereas 
four had no bodily sensations related to the experienced feeling.  The only depressed 
moment identified in the Nondepressed group did not seem noticeably different from the 
depressed moments identified in the Depressed group.   
Given that the frequency of depressed moments was so low, no solid conclusions 
can be drawn about the nature or characteristics of the inner experience of depression. 
However, we can say at the very least that the frequency of moments containing or 
reflecting depression in the Depressed group appeared to be much lower than expected 
based on the self-report measure of depressive symptomatology. There was no correlation 
(r = .08, ns) in the Depressed group between a participant‘s percentage of moments 
containing depressive content and his/her corresponding average CES-D score.    
Finally, moments that were judged to reflect a negative view of the self, world or 
future (i.e., Beck‘s Cognitive Triad) were very infrequent.  For each of the three 
dimensions, there were two samples judged to be consistent or reflective of it in the 
Depressed group and one sample in the Nondepressed group.  Thus the relative 
frequencies of these constructs were all 1% or lower.  There were no moments in either 
group judged to contain or reflect negative attributions. The percentages of moments that 
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reflected a negative attribution or a negative view of the self, world or future are 
presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Frequency of Cognitive Theories of Depression 
Participant Negative View 
of Self 
Negative View 
of World 
Negative View 
of Future 
Negative 
Attribution 
Depressed     
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 0% 0% 
4 4% 0% 0% 0% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 
6 0% 4% 4% 0% 
7 0% 0% 0% 0% 
8 5% 0% 0% 0% 
9 0% 5% 5% 0% 
Mean 1% 1% 1% 0% 
SD 2% 2% 2% 0% 
Nondepressed     
1 0% 4% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 0% 0% 
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 
5 0% 0% 4% 0% 
6 0% 0% 0% 0% 
7 0% 0% 0% 0% 
8 0% 0% 0% 0% 
9 4% 0% 0% 0% 
Mean .5% .5% .5% 0% 
SD 1% 1% 1% 0% 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
The goal of this study was to examine the inner experience of depressed and 
nondepressed individuals, looking for similarities within the groups and differences 
between them.  Aspects of experience examined included common phenomena identified 
in previous DES studies and experiences and constructs discussed in the depression-
related literature. Additionally, the study also looked for other differences between 
Depressed and Nondepressed groups and examined moments that contained sadness or 
other depression-related experiences.  
Results from the Center for Epidemiology Studies – Depression scale (CES-D) 
indicate that the Depressed and Nondepressed groups were meaningfully different, and 
that the Depressed group had severe symptoms of depression during the qualification 
phase of the study (Phase 2), declining to mild symptoms of depression over the course of 
the four sampling days.  It was unusual to have a group of depressed participants improve 
from severe to mild depressive symptomatology over such a brief timeframe as an 
untreated depressed episode typically lasts for four months or longer (Kessler et al., 2003; 
APA, 2000).  Although we cannot know for sure why the self-reported depressive 
symptomatology of these participants declined so rapidly, the two most likely 
explanations are something about the nature of the sample or something about the nature 
of the procedure.  The sample was comprised of college students and mostly young 
adults.  There is some evidence that college students experience depression in a more 
transient fashion than the general population (Oswalt & Finkleberg, 1995).  It is also 
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possible that the promise of credits that go towards a participant‘s grade in his/her class 
led to initial over reporting of depressive symptomatology, though this seems unlikely.  
With regard to the procedure, it may be that Descriptive Experience Sampling 
(DES) led to the decline in self-reported depression.  Two different though not 
necessarily mutually exclusive mechanisms could have accounted for this.  First, DES 
could have improved a person‘s awareness of his/her inner experience in a way that led 
participants to conclude that they were actually experiencing depression less severely or 
less often than they initially believed.  This would be consistent with the DES findings 
about the inner experience of the depressed participants discussed below.  Second, DES 
could have actually altered the depressed participants‘ inner experience.  DES 
participants almost universally report finding the process a positive experience.  
Additionally, there is very little attrition once participants begin sampling, which is 
indirect evidence that participants find the sampling process a positive experience.  In 
many ways the process of DES can be considered similar to what are considered common 
curative factors in psychotherapy, such as nonjudgmental attention and becoming more 
self-aware.  Thus it is possible that the DES procedure actually helped to ameliorate the 
existing depression.  To be clear, we must consider this entirely speculative at this point 
as data do not exist to support this assertion.   
Despite the rapid decline in self-reported depressive symptomatology in the 
Depressed group over the course of the study, the differences between the Depressed and 
Nondepressed groups were statistically significant and large at qualification and on each 
of the four sampling days.  Much of this was due to the very low levels of depressive 
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symptomatology reported in the Nondepressed group.  Overall, the aim of constituting 
two groups differing on level of depression for comparison was achieved.   
The differences in the inner experiences of these two groups, however, were much 
less pronounced than the differences in their levels of self-reported depressive 
symptomatology.  First, none of the constructs representing frequent phenomena of inner 
experience identified in prior DES studies differed between the groups (inner speech, 
inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, feelings and sensory awareness).  As in previous 
studies, there was substantial variability in the relative frequency of these phenomena 
across individuals, but this variability was not related to group membership nor were 
there any meaningful (or statistically significant) differences in the average levels of 
these phenomena between groups.  Furthermore, the average levels of these phenomena 
within both groups were close to average levels found by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  
Thus there were no indications that the relative frequencies of the most common 
phenomena of inner experience were related to depression status.  
When examining aspects of experience more directly related to depression, almost 
all of the observed differences were in the expected direction, but the magnitude of the 
differences were not large enough with the moderately sized sample to lead to 
statistically significant differences.  For example, the Depressed group experienced 
negative feelings more frequently than the Nondepressed groups and positive feelings 
less frequently.  The magnitude of the difference in relative frequency of negative 
feelings was medium and the magnitude of the difference in the relative frequency of 
positive feelings was small.  Moreover, the ratio of negative to positive feelings was more 
extreme in the Nondepressed group.  However, none of these differences were 
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statistically significant.  The ratio of negative to positive feelings for the depressed 
(3.3:1) and Nondepressed groups (1.4:1) were similar to those observed by Perlotto 
(2001), 4:1 and 1:1, respectively.   
A similar, though somewhat less pronounced pattern was found for overall 
positive and negative content.  The differences were in the expected direction with a 
medium effect for negative content and a small effect for positive content, and the 
negative/positive ratio was more extreme in the Nondepressed group than the Depressed 
group.  Again, none of these differences were statistically significant.   
Each moment was also examined to determine whether it contained the 
experience of depression or related symptoms including anxiety, body discomfort, fatigue 
and boredom. Momentary experiences that were observed to have depressive content 
rarely occurred in this study and were only observed in one nondepressed and three 
depressed participants. Despite the low frequency of depressive content in this study 
there was a medium effect size for the groups in the expected direction, but this 
difference was not statistically significant. Gunter (2008) found a significantly higher rate 
of depressive content in the momentary experiences of depressed individuals compared to 
the nondepressed individuals.  
The frequency of other depression-related symptoms including anxiety, body 
discomfort, and fatigue were all judged to have occurred at a higher rate in the Depressed 
group, however none of those differences reached statistical significance.  Despite not 
reaching statistical significance, moments that were judged to have anxiety or fatigue had 
medium to large effect sizes between the groups, whereas the body discomfort construct 
had a small effect size.  Boredom was found at a similar frequency between the groups.  
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In contrast, Gunter (2008) found a significantly higher frequency of anxiety content in the 
momentary experiences of depressed individuals than the nondepressed individuals.   
Though none of the constructs related to depression were found to significantly 
differ between groups, we looked at each individual moment that contained depressive 
experience to identify common characteristics between or within groups. In each moment 
a feeling of sadness was commonly described among participants.  The majority of these 
moments also included thoughts (i.e., inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, inner seeing) 
about a significant person of his/her life.  In addition, half of these moments contained 
bodily sensations in the torso area.  There did not appear to be any markedly different 
aspects of experience in these moments between the groups.   
No solid conclusions can be drawn about the nature or characteristics of the inner 
experience of depression as frequency of moments containing the experience of 
depression identified by DES was low. Notably, moments containing the experience of 
depression as identified by DES were strikingly low in comparison to depressive content 
identified on the CES-D self-report measure.  For example, on average participants in the 
depressed group endorsed items such as "I felt depressed" or "I felt sad" approximately 1-
4 days a week over the course of the study.  The same participants rarely reported inner 
experience reflecting depression over the same days. 
There were also few moments of experience consistent with the cognitive theory 
of depression and the helplessness-hopelessness theory of depression. In fact, no 
moments of experience related to attributional theory, whether positive, negative, or 
neutral were found in this study.  A prior DES study, Cavenagh (2003), was also unable 
to find a significant difference in attributional styles between depressed and nondepressed 
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participants. It may be beyond the scope of DES to capture a negative attributions.  It 
may also be that attributions are simply very low frequency events and therefore were 
missed by the relatively few samples obtained from each subject.  
The cognitive theory of depression did not fare much better than the helplessness-
hopelessness theory of depression in this study.  Momentary experiences were coded as 
representing the cognitive theory of depression if a negative view of the self, world, or 
future were identified.  Only two moments in all of the Depressed groups‘ sampled 
moments, and one moment in the Nondepressed groups‘ sampled moments, were 
identified as representing the cognitive theory of depression.  The low frequency of 
examples of the cognitive theory of depression contrasts with Gunter (2008).  He found 
more frequent evidence of the cognitive theory of depression in sampled moments using 
DES.  Specifically, Gunter (2008) found higher frequencies of dysfunctional attitudes, the 
negative cognitive triad, and negative automatic thoughts in momentary experiences of 
depressed participants compared to nondepressed participants.  It is unlikely, had we 
coded for dysfunctional attitudes or negative automatic thoughts, that a meaningful 
difference would have emerged regarding the negative cognitive triad given that Gunter 
(2008) had very high convergence between depressive content, dysfunctional attitudes, 
the negative cognitive triad, and negative automatic thoughts.   
Overall, moments of experience consistent with the cognitive theory of depression 
(Beck, 1967) and the helplessness-hopelessness theory of depression (Seligman, 1975; 
Abramson et al., 1989) were not identified often in this study and there is little support in 
these data for either theory being representative of the inner experience of depressed 
individuals. A possibility for the infrequency of momentary experiences that support the 
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cognitive theories may be that it is rare for these constructs to be present in momentary 
experiences. Despite the fact that the theories address the nature of inner experience in 
those suffering from depression, it may be the case that the theories are based primarily 
on retrospective self-reports and are tapping into negative schemas for the individual or 
into a systematic way of self-reporting depressive symptomatology.  Depressive 
symptomatology may actually occur at a much smaller frequency in momentary 
experiences of depressed participants, as was found in this study, compared to what is 
suggested by the theories and/or self-reported by depressed participants when using 
moderately or highly retrospective measures.  
Another possibility for the infrequency of depressive content in this study is that 
DES is unable to access the level of consciousness that is more representative of or 
consistent with these theories.  The Cognitive theories of depression may not be found in 
DES studies because they exist at some other level than what is directly present in 
momentary experience.   
It may be that more retrospective measures like the CES-D tap different memory 
systems than less retrospective methods like DES.  For example, as time passes, recall of 
contextual details declines which may cause random and systematic retrospective biases 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002).  As details are lost, the memory of an emotion shifts from 
episodic memory to semantic memory.  Once semantic memory has taken over for an 
event, other retrospective biases may become involved, such as belief-consistent bias 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002).  It may be in fact that the depressed participants relied on 
his/her semantic memory to characterize themselves over a week‘s time when answering 
questions on the CES-D related to depressive symptomatology.  If the depressed 
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participants did rely on semantic memory to complete self-report data, they may have 
fallen victim to belief-consistent bias and which could lead to systematic overreporting of 
depressive symptomatology.  DES minimizes errors associated with semantic memory by 
minimizing retrospection and therefore may lead to a more accurate portrait of 
momentary inner experiences (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Seibert, 2006).   
Consistent with the notion that the CES-D and DES tap different memory 
systems; studies have shown that a person‘s ability to characterize themselves over time 
can be remarkably inaccurate (Mokros, 1993; Stone et al., 2000).  For instance, Mokros 
(1993) found that depressed participants reported more sadness than the control 
participants during a clinical interview; however both groups showed similar rates of 
sadness in the data collected using the Experience Sampling Method.  In another study, 
Stone et al., (2000) monitored pain levels of 32 participants suffering from rheumatoid 
arthritis over a 7-day period using Ecological Momentary Assessment.  On the eighth day 
he asked the participants to recall their average pain level over the 7-day period. He 
concluded that the best predictors of pain level were a combination of peak and recent 
pain rather than a simple average of all momentary pain reports. Thus, the finding that the 
frequency of depressive experience discovered by DES was substantially less than what 
would be expected based on the depressed participants‘ CES-D reports is consistent with 
previous research showing the difficulty of providing accurate characterizations of 
experience over time.  
Another possible explanation for the discrepancy between the CES-D reports and 
those obtained via DES is that the CES-D may have tapped into depressive self-schemas 
which are purported by the Cognitive Theory of Depression (Beck, 1964). It may be 
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beyond the scope of DES to capture depressive self-schemas they may involve a 
cognitive process that occurs outside of direct awareness. Thus, a depressive self-schema 
may have been active in a person‘s self-report of depressive symptomatology during 
his/her completion of a self-report questionnaire but may not have had as large an impact 
on a participant‘s sampling data due to the focus of DES on ongoing experience.   
 
Limitations of the Present Study 
 The present study had a number of limitations.  First, the sample size was 
relatively small, though actually large for a DES study.  The DES procedure is time 
consuming by nature and thus a larger sample size would have required more resources 
than were available to the researchers.  Additionally, a larger sample may have revealed 
other types of experiences related to depression and it would have provided more 
statistical power for comparisons between the groups.  Another limitation of the study 
was that participants were selected from a college population and thus the results may not 
generalize to the wider population.   
 The scope of study allowed data collection over only four days. Essentially only 
about 24 seconds of each participant‘s life were collected, which is a small amount of 
time.  Such a narrow sample of momentary experiences may not provide an actual 
representation of the daily life of an individual.   
 In addition, the observed variability in experience may have been due to 
differences in the conditions under which participants sampled, especially individuals in 
the Depressed group.  Participants were free to collect their experiences at their 
convenience over the course of four days.  Apathy, isolation and lack of motivation are 
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core symptoms of depression. The DES procedure is task oriented and it requires some 
commitment and motivation to capture inner experience promptly and accurately when 
the beep sounds. DES interview requires collaboration with an interviewer to unpack the 
description of one‘s momentary experience.  It may feel highly personal and interactive. 
Such a procedure may not seem appealing to someone during a depressive episode.  It 
may be that depressed participants avoided DES sampling of days when they felt more 
depressed and preferred to sample on days when they felt more energetic and sociable, 
thereby decreasing the differences between the groups.  It is also possible that the reverse 
may be true, that the interactive and personal nature of the DES procedure may have 
lessened the depression of those in the Depressed group, thereby decreasing the 
differences between the groups. 
 Another limitation of the study was that the researchers were not blind to the 
group membership of the participants.  Being blind to the participants‘ group membership 
was difficult because the symptoms of depression were easily observable in the 
presentation of the participants.  The lack of objectivity on behalf of the researcher may 
have led to some degree of biased interviewing, though this seems unlikely given the 
observed results.  For example, had the interviewing been substantially biased by the self-
report questionnaires, the observed differences in inner experience presumably would 
have been larger.   
 Additionally, the researchers used the samples gathered on the first day.  Often 
DES studies discard the first day of sampling data because the first sampling meeting is 
considered part of the participants‘ training.  However, an informal comparison of the 
data from the sampling days indicated sufficient similarity in experiences across days to 
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use the data from the first day and, given the declining self-reported symptoms of 
depression across sampling days, it was judged to be worth the risk. 
 Another limitation of this study is that the researchers were not expert DES 
interviewers.  The DES interview requires a high level of skill and practice and has 
generally been known to take a long time to master. To minimize this limitation, the 
researchers attempted to gain ample amounts of training by practicing interview skills on 
other participants while receiving in-vivo supervision by the inventor of the method, Dr. 
Russell Hurlburt and a well-established interviewer, Dr. Christopher Heavey. The 
researchers acquired additional training by reading books on the topic authored by Dr. 
Hurlburt and Dr. Heavey, participated in DES laboratory meetings, and transcribed DES 
interviews. In addition, Dr. Heavey sat in on some of the interviews; the researchers 
randomly viewed the videos of DES interviews and received feedback on their 
performance to maximize the chances that DES was appropriately conducted.  The 
researchers‘ DES skills were considered adequate.  
 Furthermore, the researchers did not establish reliability with regard to written 
descriptions of the experience.  In order to maximize the reliability of the description of 
experience, the researchers collaborated with the participant after each experience had 
been described.  Dr. Heavey then reviewed each written description of experience.  The 
researchers gained experience with regard to written descriptions by writing descriptions 
of participants‘ sampled moments while participating in training interviews with Dr. 
Heavey and Dr. Hurlburt, as previously discussed.   
Evidence in support of the adequacy of the DES and written descriptions comes 
from the fact that the frequency of the five most commonly occurring phenomena of 
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inner experience found in this study closely resembles the frequency observed by Heavey 
and Hurlburt (2008).  Also, this finding held true when we compared the participants who 
completed the procedure under each of the DES interviewers (Gunter and Lefforge).  
Further evidence that the researchers did an adequate job in written descriptions comes 
from the fact that the researchers‘ characterization of different participants are different 
from each other, indicating that active presuppositions did not lead to everyone‘s inner 
experience being described as alike. These factors provide evidence that the researchers 
adequately employed DES.   
 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research  
This study examined the inner experience of two groups of individuals who, 
based on self-report questionnaires, differed substantially in levels of depression.  The 
most common phenomena of inner experience (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008) did not differ 
between the groups.  However, when examining aspects of experience more directly 
related to depression, almost all of the observed differences were in the expected 
direction, though not large enough in magnitude with the moderately-sized sample to be 
statistically significant. For instance, the Depressed group experienced depressive 
content, negative feelings, anxiety, body discomfort, and fatigue more frequently than the 
Nondepressed group and positive feelings less frequently. In addition, the Depressed 
group was judged to have more negative content and less positive content than the 
Nondepressed group.   
This contrast between the relative infrequency of depressive content observed in 
the Depressed group and the high to moderate levels of depressive symptoms indicated 
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on the self-report questionnaire is important.  These findings suggest the possibility that 
the types of highly retrospective reports of inner experience requested by questionnaires 
or clinical interviews may overstate, perhaps substantially, the actual presence of 
depressive experiences.  DES methodology of relying minimally on memory and more 
heavily on the pristine momentary experience may provide a better understanding of the 
everyday experiences of individuals with various levels of self-reported depression.  It 
may also be that depression exists more at the level of a cognitive process rather than in 
ongoing experience, thus influencing retrospective reports more than ongoing experience.   
 Future studies should include replication of this study utilizing a larger sample 
size.  It would also be desirable to collect a larger number of momentary experiences 
from the participants, perhaps eight sampling days.  A future study could add a step in the 
DES process to record what was happening at or just before the beep to perhaps aid in 
raters‘ judgments of momentary experiences that involve attributions.  Another 
suggestion would be to include a longer-term sampling component focusing on 
determining whether or not momentary experiences of participants change in a systematic 
way prior to, at the time of, or after a depressive episode. In addition to this 
recommendation, it would be important to collect self-report data of depressive 
symptomatology to determine if the self-reported data corresponds with findings from 
DES data. Future studies may want to sample participants on consecutive days until the 
procedure is finished in an effort to capture depressed momentary experiences at 
potentially the most severely depressed period.  For instance, the participants in this study 
decreased in self-reported symptomatology of depression relatively quickly.  
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